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ABSTRACT
BEHAVIORAL FINANCE:
FACTORS INFLUENCING ANGEL INVESTOR DECISIONS
by
Robert C. Forrester

Angel investors are individual investors who invest in high-risk projects
without the assistance of professional portfolio advisors and are an important
source of early-stage entrepreneurial financing. When providing financing, an
angel must decide how much time to spend on due diligence, the amount of wealth
invested, and the degree of post-investment interaction with entrepreneurs. As they
are individual investors, angels may be particularly influenced by behavioral
factors. In order to provide insight into the investment decisions of angel investors
this dissertation examines angel investor and deal characteristics including
demographics, experience, perception of the management team, the source that led
the entrepreneur to the angel investor, and syndication status. The dissertation
finds that angels’ decisions are influenced by rational and behavioral factors, such
as cognitive biases and social influences. While there is strong evidence that
experienced angel investors spend more time on due diligence, older investors
spend less time on due diligence after controlling for investor experience. These
results suggest that experienced angels invest in due diligence because they
understand its importance. Gender, risk perception, venture stage, and source of
deal identification also influence due diligence. In addition, older angels are found
to invest a smaller percentage of their wealth in a deal, perhaps because they seek
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to diversify holdings. More experienced angels, however, are found to invest a
larger percentage of their wealth perhaps because experienced angels are more
susceptible to cognitive biases such as overconfidence, or because they are able to
identify ventures that will do well and choose to invest more in such ventures.
Deal syndication also influences the percent of wealth invested in a deal. Other
results suggest that after making an investment, angels continue to interact with the
companies they invest in. There is strong evidence that more experienced angels
are associated with greater post-investment interaction. Gender and risk perception
also influence the degree of post-investment interaction.
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CHAPTER 1
In traditional finance theory, the predominant view is that people behave
rationally, making unbiased decisions based on relevant information (Statman, 1995; von
Neumann & Morgenstern, 1944). However, individual investors’ decisions that violate
principles of traditional finance have bedeviled researchers for years (Baker & Nofsinger,
2010; Barberis & Thaler, 2003; Fama, 1998; Miller, 1986; Shefrin, 2000; Statman, 1995;
Statman, 1999; Shiller, 2003; von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1944). Indeed, scholars
have concluded that behavioral elements in decision making are likely to be more
influential on individual investors compared with large investors or institutional investors
who rely on professional portfolio advisors and that knowledge of factors which
influence individual investors is incomplete (Barberis & Thaler, 2003; Fama, 1998;
Schleifer 2000; Shefrin, 2000; Thaler, 1999). This dissertation provides insight into
factors that influence the observed decisions of angel investors which appear to violate
the principles of traditional finance, such as investing in high risk projects that contain
high information asymmetry while performing relatively little due diligence. Moreover,
it explores variables that lead angel investors to invest time in due diligence, as well as to
invest capital in projects. An underpinning of this research is behavioral finance.
Angel investors are an important source of early-stage financing. Typically, angel
investors are individual investors who invest in high-risk, entrepreneurial projects
without the assistance of professional portfolio advisors. Angel investors invest billions
of dollars in thousands of startup companies and entrepreneurial projects annually
1
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(DeGennaro & Dwyer, 2013; Mason & Harrison, 2000; Sohl, 1999). Despite significant
financial commitment, angel investor decisions sometimes appear to violate the
principles of traditional finance. For example, rational investors have been shown to
spend time on due diligence to reduce information asymmetry and increase return on
investments. Indeed, time spent on due diligence has been shown to be positively related
to angel investor returns on investment. Some angels, though, spend no time on due
diligence (Morrissette, 2007; Sohl, 2003a; Wiltbank & Boeker, 2007b). Wiltbank and
Boeker (2007b) report that amount of time angel investors spend on due diligence ranges
between zero and 5,000 hours per investment. Despite angel investors’ growth and
significance, very little research has examined factors that lead angel investors to expend
time on due diligence as well as to invest in projects. They are one of the most common
and least studied sources for financing new ventures (Wong, Bhatia & Freeman, 2009).
Data used to examine individual investors not using professional portfolio advisors has
been difficult to obtain. Moreover, studies examining the choices made by individual
investors have been limited. Increasing availability of data on angel investors, however,
provides an ideal opportunity to examine factors influencing individual investor decision
making (Gompers & Lerner, 2010; Kaplan & Stromberg, 2003; Kerr, Lerner & Schoar,
2011; Prowse, 1998; Van Osnabrugge & Robinson, 2000). Understanding factors that
guide angel decisions should assist in increasing their returns and help ensure their
continued contribution to national economic growth.
Behavioral finance is a relatively new field that combines behavioral and
cognitive psychology with traditional finance to provide explanations for why investors
make decisions that appear to be irrational (Ackert & Deaves, 2009; Baker & Nofsinger,
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2010; Hirshleifer, 2001; Pompian, 2011; Statman, 1999). Although traditional finance
assumes that individual investors make decisions that are rational, empirical evidence
suggests that deviations from the traditional model are persistent and predictable (Ackert
& Deaves, 2009; Fama, 1998; Shleifer, 2000). Behavioral finance researchers have made
significant contributions to understanding the factors that influence individual investors,
yet the picture is incomplete (Barberis & Thaler, 2003; Fama, 1998; Shleifer, 2000;
Shefrin, 2000; Thaler, 1999).
Behavioral finance guides the present research by providing enhanced
understanding of individual investors and factors that motivate their decisions under
conditions of risk. Angel investors have to make decisions on many important issues,
including time spent on due diligence, percent of wealth to be invested, and postinvestment interaction with entrepreneurs (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Maxwell, Jeffrey &
Lévesque, 2011; Sohl, 2003b; DeGennaro & Dwyer, 2013). To better understand
investors’ decisions, demographics such as age, gender, and education (Becker-Blease &
Sohl, 2011; Dwyer, Gilkeson & List, 2002; Fünfgeld & Wang, 2009; Harrison & Mason,
2007) are analyzed. The influence of prior experience (Dimov, Shepherd, & Sutcliffe,
2007; Gustaffson, 2006; Mitteness, Baucus & Sudek, 2012), risk tolerance (Eisenhardt &
Schoonhoven, 1990; Gompers, 1995; Hambrick & Mason,1984; Michel & Hambrick,
1992; Murray, 1989; Wiltbank & Boeker, 2007b; Wright & Robbie, 1996), and
syndication (Admati & Pfleiderer, 1994; Gompers & Lerner, 2001) are also utilized.
These variables have been utilized in prior finance research, but have not been used
collectively to understand angel investor behavior.
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Prior research related to factors that shape angel investor behavior has included
angel investor due diligence analysis and its impact on returns (Wiltbank & Boeker,
2007b), differences in due diligence between angel investors and venture capital (Van
Osnabrugge, 2000), due diligence analysis and impact on expected returns (DeGennaro,
2011), as well as angel investor experience effects on learning (Smith, Harrison &
Mason, 2010). However, little prior research has examined factors that influence angel
investor decisions of time on due diligence, amount of wealth to be invested, and postinvestment interactions.
This dissertation contributes to the knowledge base of entrepreneurial finance,
angel investors, and factors that affect individual investor decisions. This dissertation is
important for several reasons. First, using the context of angel investors enhances
understanding of alternative investor situations where investors make decisions without
the benefit of professional portfolio advisors. Second, understanding angel investor
decisions regarding the amount of time spent on due diligence leads to further insight into
antecedent factors to consider when assessing effectiveness of angel investor preinvestment decision behavior and processes. Also, investigating due diligence offers
increased knowledge about information asymmetry in entrepreneurial finance.

CHAPTER 2 - LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES
Although angel investing has grown significantly, little is known about factors
that influence decisions of angel investors and drive their returns on investment. Angel
investors invest billions in new ventures each year, and the number of angel investor
groups has grown 67 percent since 1969, so both their size and importance are growing
(DeGennaro & Dwyer, 2013; Mason & Harrison, 2000; Sohl, 1999; Wiltbank & Boeker,
2007a).
Angel Investing
An angel investor is a person who provides capital, in the form of debt or equity,
from his/her own funds to a private business (Shane, 2012). Angels are typically high
net-worth individuals who provide investment capital during the risky early-stage of new
ventures (Acs & Tarpley, 1998; Benjamin & Margulis, 2001; Morrissette, 2007; Wong,
Bhatia & Freeman, 2009). These investors can be characterized as a source of informal
risk capital, i.e. capital that is invested by private individuals directly (informally) for an
entrepreneur’s use without formal intermediation by an institution, such as a bank
(Berger & Udell, 1998; Diamond, 1984).
Angel investors fall into the category of private equity investors (Benjamin &
Margulis, 2001; Berger & Udell, 1998; Fenn & Liang; 1998; Prowse, 1998). Private
equity is equity capital financing in equity securities that are not quoted or traded on a
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public exchange. Whereas public stock and bond markets that fund large businesses are
relatively transparent owing to oversight (e.g., reported financials, analysts’ reports),
private markets that finance small businesses are often opaque, which makes investing in
them more risky (Berger & Udell, 1998; Kerr, Lerner & Schoar, 2011). Although the
quantity of external private equity investments is less than that of public investments, the
quality (as measured by the success of the businesses) of the investments has positively
influenced entrepreneurs and communities (Berger & Udell, 1998). The critical private
equity needed to fund these firms can be from private equity firms, angel investors, or
venture capital firms. Angel investors are similar to venture capitalists in several ways,
including that both have similar expectations for required returns, exit horizons, and
working relationships to assist the firms in which they invest (Freear, Sohl, & Wetzel,
1995).
Angel investors invest in deals having various characteristics, including
investment size, management experience, industry, and proposed exit strategies (Van
Osnabrugge & Robinson, 2000). For example, Van Osnabrugge and Robinson (2000)
find that the average deal size ranges from $50,000 to $150,000 for each angel investor.
Several researchers find that, although angels will invest during different stages of an
investment, seed and start-up stage companies are more than three-quarters of all angel
projects (DeGennaro & Dwyer, 2013; Freear, Sohl, & Wetzel, 2000; Freear & Wetzel,
1989; Sohl, 2003a).
The early stage is crucial in fostering new venture growth. Early-stage
investments are considered high-risk and often result in a wide array of investment
returns (Van Osnabrugge, 2000; Wong, Bhatia & Freeman, 2009). As an example of the
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risk involved in early stage investing, angel returns can range from total losses of an
entire investment to yields of 50% or more (Collewaert, 2012; Mason & Harrison, 2002;
Preston, 2011). The limited financial history of new start-ups contributes to their reduced
access to capital markets, including bond markets, banks, and even vendor debt capital
opportunities, resulting in decreased available financing opportunities for early-stage
entrepreneurs. This early-stage investing increases the importance of angel investors,
because entrepreneurs at this juncture often need a bridge of capital between family and
friends and capital markets (Ibrahim, 2008). Additionally, the amount of time before
realizing a return can be much longer than a typical investment--often taking several
years relative to other types of investments where returns may be more immediate
(DeGennaro & Dwyer, 2013; Ibrahim, 2008; Mason & Harrison, 2002).
Angel investors may be driven by financial or non-financial benefits, such as
greed and fear (Morrissette, 2007; Sullivan & Miller, 1996). Some angels are clear about
their greed motivations, such as the desire to make “10 times their money and selling out”
(Hill & Power, 2002, p.36). Considering that around one-third of investments end in
bankruptcy, the fear of failure may well be a valid concern (Mason & Harrison, 2002).
Behavioral Finance
Development of behavioral finance.
Traditional finance.
A brief review of traditional finance is helpful in understanding the contribution
of behavioral finance. Modern portfolio theory (MPT) is a traditional finance theory
developed by Markowitz (1952a) to describe optimal portfolio formation by maximizing
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return for a given level of risk. MPT is important for several reasons. It provides us with
enhanced understanding of investors and their motivations, as well as firm measures that
drive portfolio selection (Elton, Gruber, Brown & Goetzman, 2009; Fama, 1980). It also
offers direction for improving firm information to achieve efficient selection, thus
fostering maximized portfolio expected returns for a given amount of risk (Markowitz,
1952a). In the Markowitz (1952a) algorithm, a person would identify a number of
outcomes and assign a probability of occurrence for a given outcome as well as a return
for the outcome. The expected return represents the average of the possible returns for
each asset, and uncertainty is represented by the standard deviation. Under this meanvariance framework, people are risk averse in all their choices. By the late 20th and early
21st century, the application of MPT gained ground in the investment and academic
communities. MPT appears to occupy a permanent place in the theory and practice of
finance.
However, in recent years MPT has been challenged by academics in the field of
behavioral economics and finance who contend that the effects of social, cognitive, and
emotional factors also influence individual decisions. For example, Sullivan (1991) finds
that return on investment is not the primary motivation of one-third of angel investors.
Primary motivations of these angels included the fun of an interesting investment and the
enjoyment of an active role in starting a company. Other non-financial benefits include
creation of jobs within a community, networking, or being a part of a group that is
making local investments (Freear, Sohl, & Wetzel, 1995; Linde, Prasad, Morse,
Utterback, Stevenson & Roberts, 2000). Other angel investor non-financial motivations
include enjoyment of helping start a new firm or assisting entrepreneurs (Leonard &
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Swap, 2000). Leonard and Swap (2000) refer to angels as “mentor capitalists,” a
reference to their enjoyment and participation in helping entrepreneurs with their new
ventures.
The efficient market hypothesis (EMH) is a classic theory in traditional finance.
It describes market prices of stocks based on the rationality of the market and market
participants rapidly using available information, providing unbiased estimates of their
values. The emerging discipline of behavioral finance has challenged the EMH on the
basis that markets are not rational and are driven by other factors, such as fear and greed
(Lo, 2004; Malkiel & Fama, 1970; Samuelson, 1965). Lo (2004) introduces the adaptive
market hypothesis (AMH), which builds on psychology of human behavior
characteristics (e.g., altruism, fairness, morality, ethics) that create human biases and help
explain market dynamics. This evolutionary perspective suggests that individuals make
choices based on past experiences and receipt of positive or negative reinforcement.
Individuals thus develop heuristics, or rules of thumb, that enable them to adapt to
economic challenges and achieve optimal solutions (Lo, 2004; Reuber & Fischer, 1994).
Under traditional finance, a rational person is assumed to have consistent
preferences, or utilities, among different things. Expected utility theory has been the
dominant theory for analysis of decision making under risk and is widely accepted as the
normative model of rational choice. Expected utility theory assumes that all reasonable
people will follow the principles of the theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979).
A utility function is a tool aimed at helping a rational person make decisions
among choices when risk is involved. In expected utility theory, the utility function
assigns weight rankings to an individual’s preferences, with higher numbers given to
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more preferred outcomes. Therefore, the weighted average of all possible levels of utility
will best represent the utility at any given point of time for an individual. Although
expected utility theory has been a dominant theory in the examination of decision making
under conditions of risk, an individual’s choices among risky prospects often exhibit
effects that are inconsistent with utility theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). An
example of individual behavior that contradicts expected utility theory is the certainty
effect. The certainty effect is a phenomenon that occurs when people overweight
outcomes that are considered certain relative to outcomes that are merely probable and is
inconsistent with expected utility theory (Allais, 1953). Several variations of the Allais
example assist in explaining the phenomenon. Below is an example of the Allais paradox
as depicted in Kahneman & Tversky (1979):
Problem 1: Choose between
A: 2,500 with probability .33
2,400 with probability .66
0
with probability .01

B: 2,400 with certainty

Problem 2: Choose between
C: 2,500 with probability .33
0 with probability
.67

D: 2,400 with probability .34
0 with probability
.66

In Problem 1, the majority of people (over 80%) prefer option B; thus, they are choosing
certainty over risk and are willing to trade away the potential for an additional 100 for the
guarantee of 2,400. In Problem 2, most people choose option C; thus suggesting that
.33u(2,500) > .34u(2,400). The choice selected in either Problem 1 or Problem 2 did not
represent irrational behavior. However, the combination of selections in Problems 1 and
2 - which were made by most people – represented inconsistency in the linear probability
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decision making and the independence axiom described in expected utility theory. The
results of the Allais examples suggest that individuals value certainty an inordinate
amount and this influences decisions. These results exemplify that attitudes towards risk
or chance cannot be captured by the expected utility model (Kahneman & Tversky,
1979).
The analysis of the Allais paradox by Kahneman and Tversky (1979) resulted in
the conclusion that individuals do not always make decisions upon complete information.
Their research suggests that people make decisions based on gains and losses and not in
terms of their state of wealth. Thus, they suggest that people dislike losses and dislike
risk in general and they feel the disadvantages of losses more than they feel the
advantages of gains. Kahneman and Tversky (1979) reveal the bias built into most
individuals and offered prospect theory as a critique and alternative to expected utility
theory.
Prospect theory and behavioral finance.
Prospect theory is a behavioral theory that suggests individuals make decisions
based on potential losses and gains relative to a reference point rather than the final
outcome of the decisions. The theory is developed to model real-life choices and
incorporate an explanation of the inconsistencies and seeming irrationality that more
accurately describe human decision making under risk as compared to expected utility
theory.
The decision weight associated with an event depends primarily on the perceived
likelihood of that event and could be subject to major biases and heuristics (Kahneman &
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Tversky, 1979). Thus, individuals will decide which outcomes are considered equivalent
and utilize these as a reference point; then the outcomes that are greater are considered as
gains and those which are less are considered as losses as shown in the figure below. The
value of the reference point can be determined by the perception of the individual
(Tversky & Kahneman, 1981). The dependence on the individual’s perception or
preferences on the decision problem is a significant concern (Tversky & Kahneman,
1981). The preferences may be influenced when a problem is framed in different ways.
For example, our perception is attuned to the evaluation of changes rather than absolute
magnitude. Thus, the gain in value between 100 and 200 appears to be greater than the
difference between 1,100 and 1,200 and the loss of 100 to 200 may appear larger than the
loss of 1,100 and a loss of 1,200 (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979).
The reference point used to evaluate utility in expected utility theory is the
amount of wealth, whereas in prospect theory the value of an outcome is measured based
on changes in wealth. The same level of wealth may imply poverty for one person and
great riches for another depending on their current assets (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979).
Note that the prospect theory value function is defined on the reference point, concave for
gains and convex for losses and steeper for losses than gains and steepest at the reference
point.
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Figure 1. Prospect theory value function.

Under prospect theory, individuals can determine their own risk preferences based
on certain heuristics and biases. Kahneman and Tversky (1979) argue that the use of
probabilistic alternatives involving risk addresses some of the weaknesses in expected
utility theory, including that people value and apply more weight to what is certain than
what is merely probable. A person is considered risk averse if he prefers the certain
prospect over the risky prospect and the risk aversion is equivalent to the concavity of the
utility function (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). With the certainty effect, it appears that
certainty increases the aversiveness of losses and the desirability of gains. In contrast, in
expected utility theory changes in risk preference would be considered as a violation of
the principles of the theory. Additionally, an individual’s simplification of prospects can
lead him to discard events of low probability and treat events of high probability as if
they were certain or overweight low probability events. This concept that individuals
may either ignore or overweight highly unlikely events through their inability to
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comprehend and evaluate extreme probabilities suggests that the difference between
certainty and high probability is either neglected or exaggerated (Shefrin & Statman,
2003).
Common examples of overweighting outcomes based on the probability and size
of the loss are the purchase of insurance and the practice of gambling. Individuals will
purchase insurance to cover against large and small losses, even when the price of the
policies exceeds the actuarial costs, an example of risk aversion. Another example of
overweighting low probability outcomes is when individuals purchase lottery tickets.
Because the odds of winning the lottery are extremely slim, purchasing lottery tickets is
considered risk-seeking behavior. However, the preference for the low potential of a
large gain (lottery winning) over the preference of the small loss of the cost of the lottery
ticket suggests that the value function for losses is convex. Interestingly, the same person
who exhibits the risk-seeking behavior of purchasing a lottery ticket may also exhibit risk
averse behavior, such as purchasing insurance to reduce risk or avoid a loss (Markowitz,
1952b), which is another example of a violation of the expected utility theory.
The reference, or value point, in prospect theory becomes more relevant when
considering attitudes towards risk (Fiegenbaum & Thomas, 1988). Although the
relationship between risk and return is commonly considered to be positively correlated,
some studies have found that there is a negative correlation (Armour & Teece, 1978;
Bowman, 1980, 1982; Treacy, 1980). Kahneman and Tversky (1979) suggest that
individuals use value or reference points in evaluating risky choices.
Tversky and Kahneman (1991) developed a theoretical framework based on an
individual’s choice that depends on a reference level or the status quo. This reference-
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dependent theory includes assumptions that alternatives are evaluated relative to a
reference point and each choice can be decomposed into its own set of attributes and
those attributes also have their own value function. Prospect theory was originally
developed to describe choices between simple risky prospects with single attributes
(money) and few outcomes. Tversky and Kahneman (1991) suggest that prospect theory
should be expanded to include multiple attributes. Reference dependence and loss
aversion with multiple attributes were studied by Hardie, Johnson and Fader (1993). The
authors examined brand choice in loss aversion and reference dependence. Their
findings suggest that multiple attributes can influence evaluation and can be seen as gains
or losses relative to a reference point in the attribute space.
Behavioral finance is useful in examining angel investor economic and financial
inconsistencies. Behavioral finance combines behavioral and cognitive psychological
theory with conventional economics and finance to understand decisions investors make
(Ackert & Deaves, 2009; Ritter, 2003; Shiller, 2003). Psychologists have been studying
decision heuristics for decades (Debondt & Thaler, 1985; Slovic, 1969, Tversky &
Kahneman, 1975; Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Shefrin & Statman, 1985). These studies
examine how and why decision makers reach outcomes focusing on the actual outcome
itself. Human behavior is a result of investors processing information using shortcuts and
emotional filters (Baker & Nofsinger, 2010). These shortcuts and emotional filters can
result in suboptimal investor decisions. These decisions may seem to be irrational and
violate the traditional assumption of risk aversion. Behavioral finance attempts to better
understand what seems to be the suboptimal investor decisions, particularly those that
impact markets and personal wealth.
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This dissertation examines behavioral factors that lead angel investors to invest in
projects, to invest time in due diligence, as well as the role due diligence and information
asymmetry have on angel investor probability of success. Another difference in this
study and other angel investor studies is the consideration of the behavioral factors that
influence angel investor decisions and the angel investor’s assessment of deal
characteristics that influence his/her behavior. Angel investor decisions are examined
based on traditional finance theory and behavioral finance. Modern portfolio theory,
expected utility theory, and prospect theory are utilized to examine angel investing and
information asymmetry.
The assessment of risk.
The level of risk is clearly an important factor when an investor is assessing
opportunities. Friedman and Savage (1948) note that individuals frequently choose
among alternatives that differ based on degree of risk. For example, in prospect theory,
the decision weight associated with an event will depend primarily on the perceived
likelihood of that event, which could be subject to major biases (Kahneman & Tversky,
1979). In contrast, under the traditional approach, the rational decision maker is assumed
to be risk averse and, therefore, would require additional reward to accept increased risk
(Tversky & Kahneman, 1981). However, assessing the probabilities of all outcomes can
be difficult, as people cannot be aware of all possible outcomes.
Risk assessments and considerations in traditional angel investments include
investment stage, top management experience, number of co-investors, and overall risk
perceptions (Wiltbank, 2005). However, biases and heuristics influence people’s

17

decisions that are not explained by traditional finance. Therefore, behavioral finance
provides key insights to assist in understanding these decisions (Ackert & Deaves, 2009;
Baker & Nofsinger, 2010; Statman, 1999).
Biases and heuristics.
Factors that influence decisions, including biases and heuristics, have received
significant attention from behavioral finance researchers. Bias refers to people’s
tendency to make decisions based on cognitive factors, such as memory, attention,
learning, problem solving, and heuristics, rather than evidence—and thus can include
errors in judgment (Barberis, Shleifer & Vishny, 1998; Bem, 1965; Daniel, Hirshleifer &
Subrahmanyam, 1998; Fama, 1998). Heuristics refers to experience-based techniques for
problem solving and learning, such as rules of thumb, to reduce the search necessary to
find the solution to a problem (Shefrin, 2000; Tversky & Kahneman, 1975). Biases and
heuristics often influence people’s decisions. Shefrin (2000, p. x) notes: “People are not
good processors of information and are frequently subject to bias, error, and perceptual
illusions.”
Bias factors that may influence investor decisions include risk perception,
framing, and overconfidence (Dimov, Shepherd & Sutcliffe, 2007; Mitteness, Sudek &
Cardon, 2012; Peters, Burraston & Mertz, 2004). Even if entrepreneurs provide the same
information to all angel investors, the information may be perceived differently based on
the angels’ biases and past experiences. The angel investor’s previous experience and
expertise allows them to focus on key areas while ignoring other areas, thus influencing
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their biases and heuristics and helping them be more efficient (Dimov, Shepherd &
Sutcliffe, 2007).
Cognitive bias.
Whereas traditional finance represents rational people who want more wealth over
less and are never confused over the forms of wealth, behavioral finance is populated by
“normal” people who are affected by cognitive biases and emotions, confused by the
forms of wealth, and are not always motivated by the desire to have more wealth
(Statman, 2008). Sometimes, the so-called “normal” people want other things, such as
more status or social responsibility and are willing to accept less wealth to achieve such
goals (Statman, 2008).
Prior studies suggest that a dramatic influence on investments is the most recent
investment an investor has participated in (Previtero, 2012). The most recent investment
influence may be due to recall. Ebbinghaus (1902) examined recall accuracy as a
function of cognitive bias. Recall or memory can create a bias based on primacy or
recency. Primacy is recalling information that is presented earlier or in a better manner
than information that is presented later on. Recency refers to items or events that are
most recently examined having a memory advantage over items retrieved from long-term
memory. The primacy and recency effects and whether or not an investor has invested in
a project in the past may influence investor behavior. The influence of investor past
success can lead to overconfidence, less diversification, and more risk taking (Merkle,
2012).
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Loss aversion, risk aversion and level of wealth
Another key feature of the major biases addressed in prospect theory is loss
aversion. Loss aversion is the tendency, for most people, to weigh losses larger than
gains. Whereas people in a mean-variance framework are risk averse in all choices,
under prospect theory people are risk averse in the gains domain and risk seeking relative
to losses. Furthermore, the influence of the certainty effect causes people to prefer a
smaller sure gain over a larger gain that is only probable, and the same effect leads to a
preference for a smaller loss that is only probable over a sure loss that is certain. The
concept of loss aversion is a psychological consideration that drives an individual’s
choice behavior in financial markets (Benartzi & Thaler, 1995). It can be impacted by
how long one holds an investment or the extent of one’s loss aversion (Benartzi & Thaler,
1995). Olsen (1997) examines loss aversion and prospect theory and finds that both
individual investors as well as groups of professionals have similar risk perspectives.
Olsen identifies four main characteristics in investor perception of risk that influence
their loss aversion: concern for a large loss, feeling of control, potential for a below-target
return, and perceived degree of knowledge. Olsen finds that risk perception explained 77
percent of the variance in his analyses. The most substantial factor in his analysis was
the ability to sell an asset in a relatively short period of time without suffering a loss. The
liquidity risk of angel investments refers to the risk of not being able to effectively exit
and thus being forced to remain in the venture or sell the investment at a high discount
(Cumming, Fleming, & Schwienbacher, 2005).
Another example of loss aversion is in the stream of research on disposition effect
(Heisler, 1994; Odean, 1998; Shefrin & Statman, 1985). The disposition effect is
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described as the investors’ disposition to sell winners too early and ride losers too long.
This reluctance of investors to realize losses is an extension of Kahneman and Tversky’s
(1979) prospect theory to investments.
The tendency for a risk averse investor to fall prey to the disposition effect may
be influenced by illiquidity (Cumming, Fleming, & Schwienbacher, 2005). The critical
point in an individual investor’s assessment of gains and losses is the reference point
from which gains and losses are measured. Under prospect theory, the value function is
defined as gains and losses from a particular reference point rather than on levels of
wealth (see Figure 1). The function is concave for gains and convex for losses and
steeper for losses than for gains. Usually the individual reference point would be the
cost or existing market value; however, “there are situations in which gains and losses
are coded relative to an expectation or aspiration level that differs from the status quo…A
person who has not made peace with his losses is likely to accept gambles that would be
unacceptable to him otherwise” (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979, p.287).
Odean (1998) finds, for some investments, particularly those held over a long
period of time, the purchase price is only one factor in determining a reference point;
thus, the reference point may be a noisy proxy for the true reference point. Rational
reasons for holding losers and selling winners include selling winners to balance a
portfolio, selling winners purchased on favorable information, believing they now reflect
the favorable information and will not rise further, or holding after a price drop believing
favorable information is not yet incorporated, and finally, to avoid higher trading costs
associated with lower priced stocks. However, even after controlling for rational
motivations, Odean (1998) finds that investors continue to prefer to sell winners and hold
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losers, which is consistent with prospect theory and the mistaken or irrational belief that
the price of winners and losers will eventually move back towards the mean or average, a
term called mean reversion. Although Odean (1998) does not differentiate between
irrational belief and mean reversion as to the reasons individuals hold losers and sell
winners, he does suggest that they may not discern the difference, thus convincing
themselves that a stock value may return rather than admit they are unwilling to take a
loss. Further, if expected future returns for the losers are greater than for the winners, the
belief would be considered rational; however, if they are not and investors continue to
hold losers against consistent indications that conflict with this belief, then this is
considered irrational (Odean, 1998).
Ibrahim (2008) provides evidence that most angel contracts are rational from a
financial perspective, yet the use of their personal funds gives angels the flexibility to
invest in a project for financial as well as non-financial reasons, including personal
reasons. Odean (1998) also noted that, for some investments, particularly those held over
a long period of time, the purchase price is only one factor for an individual to invest or
to determine a reference point for an investment. Other reasons may include the
excitement and opportunity to participate in a new venture or a desire to give back to the
community (Ibrahim, 2008). These nonfinancial benefits, also described as “psychic
income”, may shift the reference point for the value function for angel investors, thus
creating additional expected value or gain and encouraging angels to hold on to
investments for a longer period of time.
People’s preference to avoid losses over acquiring gains, which is to imply that a
person who loses $100 will lose more satisfaction than a person that wins $100 gains in
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satisfaction, is known as loss aversion high risk projects that contain high information
asymmetry (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). Risk aversion attempts to explain the aversion
behavior of people in conditions of uncertainty to reduce uncertainty in exchange for
more certain or lower expected payoffs (Holt & Laury, 2002; Pratt, 1964). Most people
are risk averse in laboratory payoffs of several dollars; however, when payoffs are scaled
up with higher payoffs in actual cash, subjects become sharply more risk averse (Holt &
Laury, 2002). Holt and Laury (2002, p.2) further state: “The nature of risk aversion (to
what extent it exists, and how it depends on the size of the stake) is ultimately an
empirical issue, and additional laboratory experiments can produce useful evidence that
complements field observations by providing careful controls of probabilities and
payoffs.” Risk aversion affects the tendency to choose the safe option when payoffs are
scaled up; however, the amount of increased payoff may be interpreted differently in
relation to an individual’s final wealth. For example, Cox and Sadiraj (2006) provide
evidence that suggests that expected utility theory does not provide an explanation of
how an agent’s initial wealth affects its attitude towards risk; thus, initial wealth must be
considered separately from income in the utility function. The authors extend the Arrow
(1971) and Pratt (1964) characterization of risk aversion to consider a model in which
risk attitude depends on initial wealth but income is not additive to initial wealth. Risk
aversion and loss aversion literature suggests that when the same choice of prospects of
gains and losses are presented in different forms, people generally have inconsistent
preferences (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979).
Studies that examine the percentage of wealth placed in risky assets when a
portfolio is limited find that risk aversion is a decreasing function of the proportion of

23

total assets (Arrow, 1971; Pratt, 1964). Prior studies, such as Cohn, Lewellen, Lease, and
Schlarbaum (1975), have also investigated the effects of the percentage of wealth
invested on allocation of individual portfolios to risky assets, as it influences the
decisions of an investor. Their findings suggest that, as wealth increases, there is a strong
pattern of decreasing relative risk aversion. Because investors are assumed to be rational,
concepts of risk aversion that might influence them have been developed (Arrow, 1971;
Pratt, 1964).

Angel investments appear to be influenced by the angel’s personal

attributes, such as wealth. For example, Chua and Wu (2012) suggest that the more
ventures the angels have helped establish, the larger the amount of initial and total
investment they make in an investment, which may also be a function of wealth. Angel
investors are typically wealthy individuals and former entrepreneurs themselves. The
percentage of wealth can be a risk proxy for angel investor decisions (Chua & Wu, 2012;
DeGennaro & Dwyer, 2013).
Framing.
Framing is the belief that how a concept is presented matters (Ritter, 2003). The
way that investors frame an outcome affects the utility they expect to receive, such as
changes in reference points, manipulations of probabilities, or decision weights
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). This critical point addresses how individuals evaluate
risky gambles and embrace risky choice behavior. Kahneman and Tversky (1979) argue
that individuals use positive or negative frames in the decision making process. Further,
they find that when events are framed positively, individuals will choose the certain event
over the gamble even if the gamble produces equal or greater expected value. Individuals
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will also choose a positively framed gamble over a negatively framed gamble even if they
have equal values.
Tversky and Kahneman (1981) show that each decision choice has two specific
phases: the initial phase where the event and related variables are framed and then the
evaluation phase. According to Tversky and Kahneman (1981), many concurrent
decisions are framed independently, thus the preferences selected would be different if
the decisions were combined.
Since individuals generally value an event based on the consequences expected,
the events are considered to be evaluated based on mental accounting (Thaler, 1985;
Thaler & Johnson, 1990). People adopt mental accounting mode of framing because it
simplifies the valuation process; it reflects the intuition that results will be linked to the
factors in the event; and it reflects the sensitivity to the desirable or undesirable changes
(Yazdipour & Howard, 2010). When people are faced with evaluating huge amounts of
data, information and decisions, they are incapable of making the complex calculations
expected under traditional finance theory and instead rely on cognitive and heuristic
based strategies found in mental accounting (Yazdipour & Howard, 2010). Heuristics,
which mainly result from the individual’s experiences, are imperfect and result in biases
and errors. Behavioralists argue that the heuristics and biases involved in framing are
systematic, or characterized in a regular and methodical order, and thereby potentially
last for long periods and affect decisions accordingly (Yazdipour & Howard, 2010).
According to traditional theory, the framing of an event should not impact its
selection because the framing does not change the event; however, this reinforces the
theory that individuals are subject to perceptual or cognitive illusions. Behavioral
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finance and prospect theory specifically address individual biases and heuristics that
address how an investor employs judgment when faced with investment decisions
involving risk. Kahneman and Tversky (1979) find that individuals tend to choose the
certain event over the gamble even if the gamble yields an equal or greater expected
value and will choose a positively framed gamble over a negatively framed one; thus
providing evidence that individuals are subject to perceptual or cognitive illusion. An
example of cognitive illusion in framing decisions is found in DeGennaro and Dwyer
(2013). The authors examine past angel investments and argue that angels do not invest
based on return on investment but rather on expected returns on investments. Their study
suggests a cognitive illusion surrounding the framing of angel investor returns. They
report angel investors earn returns that are similar to venture capital returns on similar
industries, but the angels have framed a cognitive illusion of expected returns of about
70 percent per year in excess of the riskless rate compared with the reported expected
returns for venture capitalists of 59 percent. DeGennaro and Dwyer (2013) utilized the
Angel Investor Performance Project data set employed in this dissertation (described
subsequently).
Overconfidence.
Overconfidence is a bias that causes people to overestimate their knowledge,
abilities, and judgment when making decisions. Researchers have found that investors
are overconfident about their abilities (Barber & Odean, 2001; Ritter, 2003).
Overconfidence can manifest itself in many forms, including miscalibration, which
occurs when people overestimate the precision of their knowledge. Overconfidence can
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also be seen in the better-than-average effect, which describes people’s tendency to rate
themselves above average on their attributes or skills. Another example of
overconfidence is illusion of control. Illusion of control occurs when people think they
have more control over events than they actually have. A fourth form of overconfidence,
excessive optimism, is evident when people assign probabilities to an event that are too
high/low based on historical experience or reasoning (Ackert & Deaves, 2009;
Hirshleifer, 2001).
Previous research suggests that the angel investor’s expertise in the same industry
as the investment, as well as angel investor interaction with the company they invested in,
influences angel investment outcome (Wiltbank and Boeker, 2007b). Angel investors
analyze investment choices without the benefit of a professional portfolio advisor, thus
performing their own analysis of potential investments.
In comparison to angel investors who perform their own analysis and professional
analysts who typically provide important information in financial markets, some
professional analysts perform their tasks better than others (Stickel, 1992; Sinha, Brown
& Das, 1997). Examinations of why some analysts perform better than others have
resulted in conflicting results (Clement, 1999; Jacob, Lys & Neal, 1999; Mikhail, Walther
& Willis, 1997). Clement (1999) finds that more experienced analysts have smaller
forecast errors. Mikhail, Walther and Willis (1997) develop a model that suggests that as
people practice a task, they improve and analysts with more experience issue more
accurate forecasts. However, Jacob, Lys and Neal (1999) argue that the association
between experience and forecasting accuracy results not from experience, but from
survival bias – weaker performers are forced out of the profession.
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As more information becomes available to investors, they tend to believe they can
make better decisions (Zacharakis & Shepherd, 2001). And, more information should
enable the investor to avoid problems; however, the additional information may make the
decision more complex due to contradictory information, and lack of full or proper
analysis may lead to lower decision accuracy (Zacharakis & Shepherd, 2001).
Evidence on the impact of experience on overconfidence has suggested that prior
experience or familiarity influences overconfidence (Døskeland, & Hvide, 2011), but the
directional influence of experience is foggy. The conflicting role of experience has been
addressed in psychology-based theories that suggest that experience enhances
performance through its effects on knowledge (Dane, 2010; Hunter, 1983; Libby & Luft,
1993; Schmidt, Hunter, & Outerbridge, 1986). Inasmuch, experience has been viewed as
a valuable asset that that does not directly affect performance. This implies that
experience provides opportunity for knowledge acquisition and greater knowledge
improves performance (Koonce & Mercer, 2005). Person-specific predictors of
performance may include knowledge and ability, yet there may be significant variation in
the complexity of tasks across firms and time (Koonce & Mercer, 2005). Finally,
experienced high-performers may underperform and be more of a burden in certain
situations (Birch & Bloom, 2007; Dane, 2010; Frensch & Sternberg, 1989).
In addition to overconfidence problems associated with high levels of experience,
Frensch and Sternberg (1989) argue that those with significant experience may have welldeveloped problem-solving routines and thus may be less flexible in their methodologies
and ways of thinking than those less experienced, resulting in worse performance by
highly experienced than less experienced analysts. Dane (2010) agrees that as they
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acquire domain experience experienced decision makers may lose flexibility with regard
to problem solving, adaptation and creative idea generation; however, he argues that the
inflexibility-related limitations can be circumvented. Dane (2010) further suggests that
the inflexibility arises, not from expertise, but from a high level of cognitive
entrenchment. He defines cognitive entrenchment as a high level of stability in one’s
domain schema. The problems associated with cognitive entrenchment may be
restriction of ability to identify optimal solutions, adaptation in unique situations, and the
ability to generate creative new ideas. This cognitive entrenchment can be overcome by
individuals focusing their attention on tasks not only within their area of expertise, but
also outside their domain, which will also contribute to reduced information asymmetry
problems.
Information Asymmetry Problems and Solutions
Though the heuristics, biases, risk aversion, framing, and overconfidence issues of
angel investors can influence their decisions, problems associated with information
asymmetry can also influence their decisions. Asymmetric information exists where
parties possess different information about a transaction. This can be harmful because
one party can take advantage of another party’s lack of knowledge (Akerlof, 1970).
Work by Leland and Pyle (1977), Grossman and Hart (1983) and Myers and Majluf
(1984) suggests that information asymmetry can have profound effects on investment
decisions. Information asymmetry between entrepreneurs and investors is often higher in
start-up companies than in other companies (Davila, Foster & Gupta, 2003; DiGregorio
& Shane; 2003; Sanyal &Mann, 2010).
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Information asymmetry problems.
A potential outcome of asymmetric information is that the uninformed party will
not trade with the informed party. Another possibility is that good assets can only be sold
at discounts, sometimes known as the “lemon problem” (Akerlof, 1970). In the case of
angel investors, entrepreneurs often have more knowledge of their company than angel
investors (Ibrahim, 2008). This could lead to such outcomes as experiencing poor returns
for the angel, not investing in a project with potentially good returns, or pricing the
investment too low as if it were a “lemon” (Ibrahim, 2008).
Akerlof (1970), using a car example, describes a situation where information is
limited or unknown. Because buyers are unable to distinguish between good and bad
cars (the lemon), they rate both good and bad deals as average. Healy and Palepu (2001)
describe a “lemon” problem that arises from information differences in a situation where
half the business ideas are bad and half are good. Investors and entrepreneurs value deals
using their own information (Leland & Pyle, 1977; Smith, Smith & Bliss, 2011).
Therefore, if the “lemon” problem is not resolved, they will overvalue the bad deals and
undervalue the good deals relative to the information available to them.
There are generally two manifestations of asymmetric information problems,
adverse selection and moral hazard. Adverse selection occurs when parties have
asymmetric information about the quality of an offering, thus causing a less than
desirable offering to be selected (Clarke & Shastri, 2000).
Information asymmetry can also lead to moral hazard problems. Moral hazard
occurs when the behavioral intent or actions of a party result in detriment to others, and
this action is different from what it would have been if all parties were fully exposed to
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the risk. It is a situation where a party takes a risk because the burden of taking that risk
will not be fully felt by the party taking the risk (Hölmstrom, 1979). The party that
commits the moral hazard has more information about the actions or intentions than the
party paying for the consequences. Because angels are investing their money at a very
high risk time and the entrepreneur’s business decisions may affect the angel investors
more than the entrepreneur, efforts should be taken to reduce effects of moral hazard.
The record of accomplishments for new start-ups seeking early-stage capital is
often limited by their brief time in business; as such, information asymmetry for
individuals considering an investment is high (Amit, Glosten, & Muller, 1990; Van
Osnabrugge & Robinson, 2000; Sørheim & Landstrom, 2001). Though high levels of
information asymmetry exist, angels continue to invest in start-ups (Becker-Blease &
Sohl, 2007). Problems associated with information asymmetry in angel investments are
well documented (e.g. Dennis, 2004; Morrissette, 2007; Van Osnabrugge & Robinson,
2000; Wiltbank, 2005).
Smith and Watts (1992) provide an example of problems associated with
information asymmetry by suggesting that managers of high-growth firms have superior
knowledge about the firm’s investment opportunity, as well as better knowledge of the
expected future cash flows from their existing assets. Therefore, angel investors must
assess top management and their experience in order to reduce information asymmetry
and the associated adverse selection and moral hazard problems. For example,
Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven (1990) empirically relate characteristics of the founding topmanagement team, strategy and environment to sales growth in newly founded firms in
the semiconductor industry. Beckman, Burton and O’Reilly (2007) find that prior top
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management team experience positively influences the rate of receiving venture capital
funds and going public. Additionally, top management teams with diverse backgrounds
and experience will be able to reach entrepreneurial milestones more quickly than less
experienced teams. In summary, the prior experience, prior company affiliations and
functional experience of the top management team are important correlates of success.
Firms with experienced team members from a range of experience will be successful
more quickly than other firms (Beckman, Burton & O’Reilly, 2007; Burton, Sørensen &
Beckman, 2002; Chandler & Hanks, 1998; Schefczyk & Gerpott, 2001), thus suggesting
that reducing the information asymmetry surrounding the top management team would
help prevent adverse selection problems with the investment.
Due diligence.
Due diligence is defined as gathering information on the potential investment; it
often involves verifying facts, background checks, size of the targeted market, growth
potential, cash flow projections, and asset valuation (DeGennaro, 2011). The impact of
investing in risky projects has been examined and it has been determined that rational
investors will take steps to reduce the risk in their portfolio (Lintner, 1965; Miller, 2012).
Key purposes of due diligence are to reduce information asymmetry, ascertain whether a
project is suitable for funding, and improve the likelihood of positive returns (Allen &
Santomero, 1997; DeGennaro, 2011; Dixon, 1991; Fiet, 1995b).
While risk aversion describes the investor who, while exposed to uncertainty in
investments with similar expected returns, attempts to reduce the uncertainty (Pratt,
1964), time spent on due diligence (i.e., deeper investigation into the person, business,
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and/or industry being invested in) has been shown to be positively related to reducing
information asymmetry and improving angel returns (Wiltbank & Boeker, 2007b).
Although prior research determines that due diligence by angel investors is significant,
that research does not explain why angel investors’ time spent on due diligence varies
significantly. This dissertation examines angel characteristics and deal characteristics in
an effort to determine the influences that affect the amount of time an investor devotes to
due diligence, as well as the factors that influence the percentage of wealth an angel
invests in a project and the amount of time an angel spends on post-investment
interaction with the firm.
Screening is a due diligence process for combating adverse selection under
information asymmetry (Balakrishnan & Koza, 1993; Smith, 1987; Ibrahim, 2008).
Investment screening typically involves an investor’s examining the attractiveness of an
opportunity. Initial screening usually involves two elements: an initial examination of
whether a proposal meets the angel’s personal investment criteria followed by a detailed
investigation, or due diligence (Mason & Harrison, 2003). Investment criteria might be
knowledge of the industry sector, interest in the sector, amount of funding sought,
location, stage of development or perhaps “gut feel” (Mason & Harrison, 2003). Screens
are designed to identify characteristics and behaviors in the entrepreneur to determine
“fit” with the angel’s criteria. For example, if the entrepreneur’s values, management
team, and strategy do not align with the angel’s and are identified during the screening
process, then the project might not move forward. This may involve an examination of
market size, strategy, technology, competition, management team, and contract terms
(Kaplan & Stromberg, 2001; Stuart, & Abetti, 1990). The opportunity may also be

33

examined in terms of location, kind of business, requisite amount of money, and other
business criteria. The aim of this early stage is to assess whether to justify the investment
of time for the additional due diligence. Riding, Dal Cin, Duxbury, Haines, and Safrata
(1993) find that 72.6% of opportunities were rejected in the initial screening stage, but
only 15.9% were rejected after the more detailed due diligence. As due diligence
progressed, though, another 6.3% were eliminated, for a cumulative rejection rate of
94.8%.
Due diligence helps to reduce information asymmetries and decreases potential
risk in angel investing. However, research suggests that an angel investor’s time spent on
due diligence is not correlated with the size of the initial investment and does not increase
with additional investment. However, time spent on due diligence does increase with the
percentage of wealth invested (DeGennaro & Dwyer, 2013; Mitteness, Baucus & Sudek,
2012; Smith, Harrison & Mason, 2010; Wiltbank & Boeker, 2007b). Low levels of due
diligence on risky projects are in direct contrast to the principles of traditional finance.
Previous psychological and finance research, though, indicates that behavioral variables
can help explain departures from rational behavior under conditions of risk (Ritter, 2003;
Statman, 1999).
As the number of hours angels spend on due diligence varies considerably, it is
important to understand reasons for differing amounts of time that an angel investor
expends on due diligence and factors that affect those decisions. Though time spent on
due diligence improves angel investor returns, Van Osnabrugge and Robinson (2000)
find that angel due diligence is less detailed and results in lower returns than similar
investments, such as venture capital. Van Osnabrugge and Robinson find that angel due
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diligence typically entailed collection of fewer independent references about an
entrepreneur than venture capitalists (0.96 versus 4.2 references), and angels experienced
lower returns (32 percent for angels versus 90 percent for venture capitalists).
Staged financing.
Prior studies have examined the role of the stage of an investment, as well as coinvesting and post-investment participation (interaction) on investment returns to angel
investors (Wiltbank, 2005). That analysis finds that post-investment participation by
angel investors reduces information asymmetry. It also suggests that co-investors reduce
the necessity to invest time in due diligence.
Angels prefer to provide financing to companies at various stages of their growth
versus all at once (Wong, Bhatia, & Freeman, 2009). Staged financing provides several
benefits, including reduced risk and increased control. Staged financing is thought to
work so well that Gompers and Lerner (2001) describe it as “the most potent control
mechanism a venture capitalist can employ.” Angel investors often invest in the earlier
stages of a firm as compared to other investors, including venture capitalists (Wong,
Bhatia & Freeman, 2009). However, angels are not as reliant on the traditional forms of
control such as contracts and board control (Wong, Bhatia & Freeman, 2009). More
often, they reduce the agency costs by forcing the entrepreneur to hold a higher stake in
the firm. The higher stakes held by the entrepreneur tends to align the interest of the
entrepreneur with that of the angel investors while also reducing agency costs (Wong,
Bhatia, & Freeman, 2009).
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The sequential stage developmental process for new business has been studied
extensively (Lewis & Churchill, 1983; Greiner, 1972; Kimberly & Miles, 1980; Ruhnka
& Young, 1987). Ruhnka & Young (1987) analyzed the perceptions of 73 U.S. venture
capital firms about key features of the stage development process for new business
ventures. These stages are central to most “stages of development” theories and are
arguably of critical importance in the growth, survival, and financial success of new
ventures (Ruhnka & Young, 1987). The stages of development of a firm that angels
invest in have different levels of information asymmetry and different levels of risk
(Bruno & Tyebjee, 1986; Cooper, 1981; Gaibraith, 1982; Pratt & Bokser, 1998; Ruhnka
& Young, 1987). The stages of firm development that an angel invests in are seed stage,
start-up, early growth, late growth, and the turnaround stage.
The seed stage is considered the stage where a person or company approaches the
angel investor for funding for an idea or product. There may or may not be a prototype
product that has been fully developed or tested at this stage. There has usually not been
any income generated by the firm at this stage. At the seed stage, a relatively small
amount of money is needed to prove a concept or develop a product. The start-up stage
begins after the seed stage. At this point an economic feasibility analysis of the idea or
product has been completed by angel investors and a business plan has been presented to
the angel investor. A fully developed prototype of the product will be built and tested
during this phase. Market research is completed to determine if the market is large
enough to support the idea. The start-up stage describes companies in business for less
than one year and whose product has not been commercially marketed. Next, at the early
growth stage, the idea or product is being produced and sold on the market. The
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company is trying to gain market share and achieve break-even on the expenses and the
investment. The growth is guided by the natural growth of the market; however, tasks
are being aimed at making the firm more profitable through modifying the product and
often second-generation products are beginning to appear (Gaibraith, 1982). During the
late growth, or maturity, stage the company is trying to expand the company and the
market share. Follow-up products are being introduced into the market and the company
is trying to expand the life-cycle of existing products. Ruhnka & Young (1987) present
data that suggests that characteristics for companies in this late growth stage generally
include companies that have seasoned management, have been in business for five or
more years, have an established product, breakeven or profitable financials, and
increasing sales. A turnaround stage involves a company that is generally in financial
trouble and involves a process of recovery and investment to stabilize the situation,
address management issues and implement emergency actions that create value to return
to profitability (Bruno & Tyebjee, 1986; Pratt & Bokser, 1998; Ruhnka & Young, 1987).
The firm in this turnaround stage generally has higher competitive risks and is having
difficulty increasing sales or market share. These companies may also show signs of
being undercut in the market by unanticipated competitors, which may result in a closed
“window” of opportunities for capital investors to offer an initial public offering or
otherwise cash out their investment. This stage often requires repositioning the product
or keeping the investee alive until a liquidation or merger can be achieved (Ruhnka &
Young, 1987).
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Angel investors tend to invest in ventures at the earlier stages of investment (seed
and startup stage) when the information asymmetry tends to inhibit the securing of
financing through other sources (Mason & Harrison, 1995; Prowse, 1998; Wetzel, 1983).
Syndication
Syndication occurs when two or more investors, such as angel investors or
venture capitalists, share in the financing of a venture (Lerner, 1994). As of 2007,
approximately 10,000 accredited angel investors belong to 265 angel groups, thus
providing evidence of angel investors’ desire to invest alongside other angels
(www.angelcapitaleducation.org). Angel investors sometimes organize into angel groups
to share research, pool their investment capital, and reduce risk (Aram, 1989; Markova &
Perkovska-Mircevska, 2009; Sohl, 2012; Wong, Bhatia &Freeman, 2009). Research
suggests that typically at least two or three angels invest in each deal, with most angel
investors preferring to invest with other angels (Freear, Sohl & Wetzel, 1995; Gaston,
1989; Van Osnabrugge & Robinson, 2000). Given that angels desire to invest with other
angels, and angels have capital available to invest, syndication provides additional
growth opportunities for entrepreneurs.
Syndication attempts to formally organize angels and to create a more efficient
angel market (i.e., known as “angel networks”). These networks are typically operated
by a not-for-profit, such as a university (Berger & Udell, 1998). The networks provide
angels opportunity to invest with other “qualified” angel investors. Qualified investors
are those investors who meet the Securities and Exchange Commission accredited
investor standards, which include a net worth of at least $1 million and an annual income
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of $200,000 for the previous three years or a combined income with their spouse of
$300,000 (U.S. SEC, 2012).
Analysis of angel investor practices of investing alone or with others has been
difficult, due to lack of large data sets (Bammens, & Collewaert, 2012; Fenn & Liang,
1998). Goldfarb, Hoberg, Kirsch, and Triantis (2009) analyze 182 venture financing
deals including only 32 angel investors to examine syndication of deals with angels
alone, angels with venture capitalists, and venture capitalists alone. Their study finds that
angels who invest alone are slower to liquidate, thus suggesting that angel investors may
have enhanced patience or possibly weaker control rights. The study also shows that
angels frequently invest alongside venture capitalists, purchase the same stocks, and
experience similar returns.
Angels are presented with many opportunities to invest over the course of a year.
Angels often invest with other angels in groups. Psychoanalytic theory is useful in
understanding syndication. Some angel members define their tasks, are clear about their
purpose, and work together with other members in an investment. Other members may
not think for themselves but engage in groupthink. Groupthink provides good feelings
and comfort to group members through unconscious defenses adopted by the members
rather than creative, reality-based thinking and functioning (Janis, 1982). In this
scenario, a divided state of mind takes over from reality-based thinking, and information
is evaluated to promote the good feelings and excitement while the negative feelings are
split off from the awareness. This can result in ideas where investors become caught up
in the good feelings and excitement, or unconscious wishful thinking, and split off or
deny the underlying risk. Shiller (2005, p.159) describes this paradox as “completely
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rational people” becoming caught up and producing “behavior that is, in a well-defined
sense, irrational.” An example would be two previously successful angel investors
agreeing to invest in a project and other angel investors joining the project because of the
excitement, perhaps without performing due diligence. Groupthink falls under the
category of emotions in behavioral finance and draws on how people’s emotions and
feelings help drive all investment activity. Groupthink leads to homogenous behavior.
Even the homogenous behavior may be caused by cognitive error, the more homogenous
the behavior of irrational investors, the larger the effect on the investment. This
groupthink can be referred to as herding - and herding based on cognitive error can steer
the investment away from its fundamental value.
Although much heterogeneity exists between angels and venture capitalists
investing together, the angel-only deals fail the least often (Goldfarb, Hoberg, Kirsch, and
Triantis, 2009). Other studies argue that venture capitalists who network together through
syndication increase their performance, as measured by better exit rates (Hochberg,
Ljungqvist & Lu, 2007). Syndication, staged financing, and convertible securities are
seen as solutions to information asymmetry problems between entrepreneurs and
uninformed investors (Metrick & Yasuda, 2011).
Angel investors often use syndication to reduce individual angel risk by spreading
risk over several investors versus taking on all the risk themselves (Wong, Bhatia &
Freeman, 2009). There are other reasons that angels invest together. For example, some
angel investors invest for reasons other than ROI, such as they enjoy lending their
expertise to other angels and to entrepreneurs seeking angel investments (Sudek, 2006).
Evidence supporting the non-financial investment reasons suggests that due diligence
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decisions are affected by group structure that allows “experts” to evaluate, monitor, and
vouch for deals in their area of expertise while others can invest for their own reasons
(DeGennaro, 2010; Mason & Harrison, 2008). Experts who “champion” a deal tend to
conduct better due diligence than they would to satisfy themselves in an effort to protect
their reputation (Payne & Macarty, 2002). Thus, a kind of free rider effect regarding time
spent on due diligence can occur by other angel investors. This dissertation proposes to
enhance the prior qualitative approach with a quantitative analysis and incorporate
additional data to test the reasons angels spend time on due diligence.
Syndication can facilitate due diligence/monitoring and add value to an
investment if investors are able to share their specific knowledge and complementary
skills. Syndication, however, can also hinder due diligence/monitoring because of the
free-rider problem (Das & Teng, 2002; Dimov & Milanov, 2010; Wright & Lockett,
2003; Wright & Robbie, 1998; Manigart, Lockett, Meuleman, Wright, Landström,
Bruining, Desbrières & Hommel, 2006; Sorenson & Stuart, 2001). The free-rider
problem refers to parties who benefit without paying for the cost of the benefit.
The free-rider problem associated with angels in groups might include angels who
participate in time spent on due diligence/monitoring and other angels who benefit from
their efforts. Das and Teng (2002) argue that a social exchange of controls mitigates the
free-rider problem when three or more parties are involved. Because the exchange of
information entails reciprocity, accountability is relatively high and the free-rider
problem is easy to detect. The social exchange theory also suggests a high need for trust
and a deep sense of solidarity over time. When free-riding is detected, both social
sanctions and a cooperative culture can be utilized to remedy the problem. Cooperative
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culture is reciprocity of benefits, while social sanctions reduce free-riding by damaging
the reputation of the member involved (Das and Teng, 2002). This process of social
sanctions and cooperative culture typically results in all individual investors contributing
to the success of the investment through their individual strengths (Das and Teng, 2002).
The information asymmetry problems in angel investing are numerous and
complex, so research into solutions to reduce the information asymmetry has included
increased angel investor due diligence, monitoring of the investment, staged investments
of funds into the firm, and syndication of other angels into the investment. Each of these
solutions has provided evidence to suggest increased investment return. The
combinations of these solutions as they relate to other angel behavioral factors should
lead to further enhancements in the behavioral finance literature regarding individual
investors that do not use professional portfolio advisors and angel investors in particular.
Theory Development and Hypotheses
This dissertation examines the factors that influence angel investors’ amount of
time spent on due diligence, the percentage of wealth invested in a project, and the
amount of post-investment interaction between the angel investor and the firm, the three
dependent variables. The choice of the independent variables follows the prior literature,
which suggests that demographic factors, experience and risk tolerance shape these
decisions.
Understanding the behavioral bias and heuristic influences that affect the framing
of investment choices of angel investors, including time spent on due diligence, the
amount of wealth invested in a project, and post-investment interaction, may provide
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implications for stock selections, asset valuation and performance based management
contracts.
Dependent variables.
Time spent on due diligence.
Time spent on due diligence (i.e., deeper investigation into the person, business,
and/or industry being invested in) has been shown to reduce information asymmetry and
improve angel returns (Wiltbank & Boeker, 2007b). Angel investments are considered
high risk projects that contain high information asymmetry. Information asymmetry
exists in many areas of the investment, including the top management team (TMT), stage
of the investment, the number of co-investors that will invest and the past experience of
the co-investors, and the source of the investment. Past research has used a variety of
factors to evaluate opportunities and risk tolerance of angel investors (Haines, Madill &
Riding, 2003; Mason & Stark, 2004). Risk tolerance includes examination of the
entrepreneur’s management team and its prior experience/track record (Haines, Madill &
Riding, 2003; Mason & Stark, 2004). The competence and experience of the top
management team can assist in overcoming market challenges that arise. Van
Osnabrugge and Robinson (2000) find that although angels emphasize the importance of
the management team, angels are less deterred by gaps in the management team because
angels can contribute to management expertise through personal involvement with the
investment. However, time spent on due diligence might lead to reducing information
asymmetry in many of these areas and improved angel returns. Other than returns, the
factors that drive time spent on due diligence have not previously been examined. It is
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unknown whether angel investors are influenced by behavioral factors that might
influence their time spent on due diligence. This leads to the first testable hypothesis,
stated in the null form:
Hypothesis 1 – There is no relationship between angel investor behavioral factors
and time spent on due diligence.
Percent of wealth invested.
Investors are assumed to be rational and concepts of risk aversion have been
developed to describe their behavior (Arrow, 1971; Pratt, 1964). Risk aversion of an
investor describes the tendency of the investor to reduce the uncertainty while choosing
among risky investments with similar expected returns (Pratt, 1964). Studies that
examine the percentage of wealth placed in risky assets find that risk aversion is a
decreasing function of the proportion of total assets. For instance, an investor whose
utility for total assets is unchanging and whose assets are increasing would be willing to
pay less for insurance as his risk aversion for a risky asset has decreased as his wealth
increased (Arrow, 1971; Pratt, 1964). Prior studies, such as Cohn, Lewellen, Lease, and
Schlarbaum (1975), have investigated the effects of the percentage of wealth invested on
allocation of individual portfolios to risky assets. The percentage of wealth invested is a
proxy for angel investor risk tolerance. Most angels are considered to be wealthy. An
examination of the behavioral influences on the percentage of wealth invested may help
explain angel investor decisions.

44

The same predictors included in Hypothesis 1 are included in Hypothesis 2, which
consist of demographic measures, measures associated with experience, and measures
associated with risk tolerance. The second testable hypothesis, stated in the null form is:
Hypothesis 2: There is no relationship between angel investor behavioral factors
and the percent of wealth invested.
Since many early stage entrepreneurs may have little business experience,
different contractual relationships between angel investors and entrepreneurs are required
to deal with agency problems and information asymmetry, and to create additional value
(Keuschnigg & Nielson, 2003). Tyebjee and Bruno (1984) present a useful guide
describing post-investment activities for venture capital (VC) investors. Although there
are differences between VC and angel investors, the guide is still useful in describing
post-investment activities. The authors list post-investment activities as sitting on the
board, orchestrating mergers and acquisitions, recruiting key executives or managers,
acting as a sounding board to the CEO, evaluation of the top management team, working
on strategy development, and providing guidance and business contacts. The investor
interaction activities can be separated into monitoring activities and value adding
activities.
Monitoring is observing and supervising activities to ensure they are on course to
meet the objectives and targets. Information asymmetry results in costly monitoring of
firms (Diamond, 1984; Healy & Palepu, 2001). Diamond (1984) recognizes that
monitoring is critically important and that reducing costs in the investment is also
important. Prior studies on the determinants of internal rates of return in venture capital
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and private equity investments have found that the more advice and monitoring provided
contribute to a significant increase of the internal rate of return realized (Cumming and
Walz, 2009).
Gompers (1995) finds that the information asymmetry in new startups makes
monitoring and governance extremely important. His evidence further suggests that the
staging of capital infusions provides opportunities to gather information and monitor the
progress of the firm. This monitoring may lead to further investments, or abandoning a
project. The shorter the duration between rounds of financing, the more frequent the
monitoring of the project. While the duration of a round of financing is one method of
monitoring, the total amount provided and the number of rounds are also important in
staged investments (Gompers, 1995).
While monitoring protects the interest of the angel investor, value adding activities,
such as a sounding board, business advisor, professional consultant, mentor, confidant,
manager recruitment and supplier and customer recruitment, also require an investment in
time (Sapienza, Manigart, & Vermeir, 1996). Research suggests that post-investment
interaction is value adding (Chua & Wu, 2009). Since post-investment interaction is
valuable to the entrepreneur and the angel investor, the implications of behavioral
influences on interaction decisions are explored.
The same predictors included in Hypothesis 1 and 2 are included in Hypothesis 3,
which consist of demographic measures, measures associated with experience, and
measures associated with risk tolerance. The third testable hypothesis, stated in the null
form is:
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Hypothesis 3: There is no relationship between angel investor behavioral factors
and interaction.
Independent Variables.
Demographics.
To better understand investors’ decisions, demographics such as age, gender,
education, and experience have been included in prior financial research (Becker-Blease
& Sohl, 2011; Dwyer, Gilkeson & List, 2002; Fünfgeld & Wang, 2009; Harrison &
Mason, 2007). These demographic characteristics may influence angel investor
decisions. Early extensive research finds that most angel investors are middle-aged,
wealthy males with college degrees, and later works confirm that the profile still holds
(Gaston, 1989; Freear, Sohl & Wetzel, 1995; Maula, Autio & Arenius, 2005; Morrissette,
2007; Stedler & Peters, 2003).
Economic researchers examining factors that influence risky investments have
found that age, wealth, education, and risk perception are predictors of investor decisions
(Guiso, Haliassos, & Jappelli, 2002; Perraudin & Sorensen, 2000). Age, gender and
education level are typical demographic considerations in the literature. Age has been
determined to affect people’s attitudes and behavior (Dohmen, Falk, Huffman, Sunde,
Schupp, & Wagner, 2011). As investors age, they become more cautious, seek greater
certainty, and are more reluctant to adopt new technologies (Akhter, 2003; Botwinick,
1973; Gilly & Zeithaml, 1985). The influence of age and experience on angel investors’
behavioral decisions to spend time on due diligence are examined.
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Gender differences in attitudes and behavior have been extensively studied in the
psychology and investment literatures (Croson, & Gneezy, 2009; Powell & Ansic, 1997;
Schubert, Brown, Gysler & Brachinger, 1999; Weber, Blaise & Betz, 2002). Studies
report that men engage in more risk-taking than women (Hinz, McCarthy & Turner,
1997; Sunden & Surette, 1998). Additionally, men tend to display more overconfidence
and rely more on themselves than others in their decisions (Barber & Odean, 2001;
Lewellen, Lease & Schlarbaum, 1977; Lundeberg, Fox & Punćcohaŕ, 1994). Prior
studies suggest that angel investors are 84-97% male (Gaston, 1989; Freear, Sohl &
Wetzel, 1995). The informal venture capital market does not appear as a gender
differentiated market; however, some researchers have suggested that sufficient genderbased issues, such as gender-based perceptions of risk and possible female support for
female entrepreneurs, exists. Therefore, gender should be included in the analysis of
angel investor decisions (Harrison & Mason, 2007; Olsen & Cox, 2001).
The education of angel investors falls into the demographic analysis. Several
studies have found that angel investors are highly educated, with Aram (1989) finding
that 82% of informal investors in the US have at least undergraduate degrees and 28-42%
have graduate degrees (Aram, 1989; Gaston, 1989; Van Osnabrugge & Robinson, 2000).
This is consistent with the theory of planned behavior that suggests a high level of
education is likely to be positively associated with perceived behavioral control and with
beliefs in one’s own capability to make successful investments (Ajzen, 1985).
Additionally, household portfolio theory also predicts a positive relationship between
level of education and successful household investments in risky assets (Guiso, Haliassos

48

& Jappelli, 2002). Thus, demographic influences such as age, gender, and education may
be factors that influence investors in risky projects and are examined by this research.
Experience.
The level of investing experience can affect investor returns and decisions.
Studies examining previous investing experience of angels in other angel investments
conclude that angels have varying levels of investment experience, with most studies
revealing that angels, on average, invest in one deal every two years (Freear & Wetzel,
1991; Sullivan, 1991). Furthermore, recent successes/failures in investing can influence
individuals’ investment decisions. The psychology literature on systematic errors in the
way people think indicates that people place too much emphasis on their recent
experiences (Ritter, 2003).
In order for angel investors to continue investing, they have to have been
reasonably successful. Many angels have achieved success as an entrepreneur (Van
Osnabrugge, 2000). Success as an entrepreneur in building their own new ventures can
lead to experience that adds value to the new ventures in which they invest. The number
of years that the angel investor has been an entrepreneur is an angel investor experience
factor in this analysis.
Angel investors who have prior experience in founding firms likely have more
experience in firm valuation (Hsu, 2007). Prior experience in valuation can remove some
information asymmetry and assist with successful deal construction. Additionally, those
with more successful prior funding experience exhibit a track record that infers, or
signals, quality of their experience and may lead to additional deals (Spence, 1973). The
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number of firms previously founded by the angel investor is another angel experience
variable.
The total number of exits an angel has experienced is examined as a component of
experience. There are several ways that an angel investor can exit an investment. The
exit can come from a shareholder buy back, through the sale of the company, or through
an initial public stock offering (IPO). These successful exits generally require the
company to be developed over a period of years. Unsuccessful exits would include those
where a company was closed. The total number of exits an angel has experienced may
signal prior success in angel investments which could influence investing decisions
through primacy and recency effects.
To examine whether individual experience attributes are related to angel investing
decisions, this dissertation examines these factors: years an angel investor has spent
investing, years that an angel has been an entrepreneur, the number of firms an angel has
founded, the number of previous investments an angel investor has made, and the number
of previous exits that an angel has experienced as the components of experience.
Top-management-team experience.
Since the quality of the top management team (TMT) is associated with positive
outcomes of the firm, angel assessment of top management prior experiences and
backgrounds is essential to reducing information asymmetry and the related adverse
selection problems. Seven questions that reveal information on the background and prior
experience of the top management team are utilized:
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•

Has the top management founded and led other ventures; has the top management
been successful in other ventures?

•

Does the top management have significant large firm experience?

•

Does the top management have significant technical expertise?

•

Does the top management have significant management expertise?

•

Does the top management have significant sales and marketing expertise?

•

Does the angel not know about the details of the top management of the
investment?
There is a natural linkage between TMT and firm performance (Hambrick &

Mason, 1984). In addition to evaluating the TMT experience, angels must consider
whether or not the TMT is one of the top three strategic challenges the business faces.
Angels may determine that they may be able to assist in choosing or training the TMT
members. Williamson (2000) suggests that new venture entrepreneurs seek advice from
those nearest to them. Thus, it is possible that the TMT has limited experience; however,
angels may believe that this may or may not hinder the investment. Whether or not
management risk is considered to be a strategic risk of the investment is considered in
this analysis.
Stage of the investment.
Angel investments are considered high-risk and often result in a wide array of
investment returns (Van Osnabrugge, 2000; Wong, Bhatia & Freeman, 2009). Such
returns can range from total losses of an investment to yields of 50% or more
(Collewaert, 2012; Mason & Harrison, 2002; Preston, 2011). The perception of risk
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varies across stages of the firm’s development. Ruhnka & Young (1987) provide
empirical evidence that the perceived risk of loss is highest in the seed stage and
decreases in later stages. The decrease in the estimated risk of loss in succeeding stages
of development should influence angel investor behavior towards the amount of money
invested and time spent on due diligence.
Since angel investors tend to invest in ventures at the seed and startup stage
(Mason & Harrison, 1995; Prowse, 1998; Wetzel, 1983), this dissertation examines the
impact of seed and start-up stage and their influence on decisions to spend time on due
diligence and the percentage of the angel investor’s wealth invested in a project.
Syndication.
Angel investors use syndication, or the co-investing with other angel investors, to
reduce individual angel risk by spreading risk over several investors versus taking on all
the risk themselves (Wong, Bhatia & Freeman, 2009). This analysis uses the number of
other investors that joined in the investment at the time the angel investor invested to
determine if syndication influences the decision to spend time on due diligence and the
percentage of the angel investor’s wealth invested in a project.
Source of the deal.
Angel investors learn about potential investments through a variety of sources,
such as previous friendship with the entrepreneur, referrals from friends, group
screenings, and group presentations. A trust bias may be reflected in due diligence and

52

percent of wealth decisions. Other biases, such as herding, may be reflected in decisions
regarding investments resulting from group screenings.
The initial screening stage filters out the majority of the proposals that angels
receive (Mason & Harrison, 2003). Angels may receive written investment proposals,
such as an executive summary of a business plan from an entrepreneur, another angel
group, or a formal intermediary. During the initial screening, deals are considered for
“fit”, or whether the deal meets the investor’s criteria, such as interest, stage of
development, amount of funding sought, and location (Mason & Rogers, 1997). The
screening process may occur over a relatively short time, sometimes less than ten
minutes, and will be subject to due diligence later (Hall & Hofer, 1993; Mason & Rogers,
1997). The initial screening can be important because the majority of deals are rejected
at this stage (Feeney, Haines, & Riding, 1999).

CHAPTER 3 – METHODOLOGY
This dissertation utilizes data from the Angel Investor Performance Project
(AIPP), the largest data set on accredited angel investors available. It consists of
responses from 86 investor groups with 539 investors who made 3097 investments from
1972 through 2007. The Ewing Marion Kauffman Foundation and the Angel Capital
Education Foundation with Willamette University and the University of Washington
initiated the research to gather the data, which was collected by Wiltbank & Boeker
(2007). The survey is comprised of 83 questions and was designed to be completed in
between 5 and 20 minutes (see Appendix A). Respondents were offered the opportunity
to receive a notification of the aggregated statistics that were compiled from the results of
the survey as well as a free copy of The Entrepreneurial Initiative, a book by the
president and CEO of the Kauffman Foundation, Carl Schramm.
Though many researchers do not distinguish between angel investors and angel
groups (DeGennaro & Dwyer, 2013), an important trend is emergence of angel investor
groups (Wiltbank & Boeker, 2007b). Angel investor groups are comprised of angels who
work together to consider investments, offer opinions and expertise, and join forces with
their capital. Angel investors invested an estimated $26 billion in entrepreneurial
business in the United States in 2007, yet little is known about the individuals who play a
crucial role in start-up capital (Angel Capital Education Foundation, 2013). Research on
angel investors and angel groups has been limited due to the fact that suitably large
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data sets have not been available (DeGennaro & Dwyer, 2013). For example, some
studies, such as Goldfarb, Hoberg, Kirsch and Triantis (2009), utilize as few as 32 angelonly investments. The Kauffman Foundation’s Angel Investor Performance Project on
angel investments comprises data from 588 investments.
The angel investor survey was sent to 276 angel investor groups, asking their
members to respond confidentially to an online questionnaire. Eighty-six groups
participated in the survey and of those eighty-six groups, thirteen percent of members
(539 angel investors) responded. Wiltbank & Boeker (2007) address the possible nonresponse problems with the survey data and provide evidence that the AIPP data are
relatively free of these types of problems. They also address the problem of relatively
low response rates by comparing within-groups returns and determine that the
distribution is similar in high response rate groups to those with low response rates, thus
providing little evidence of correlation of returns with reporting frequency.
Initially, a series of descriptive statistics are reported to describe the variables of
interest as well as this sample of investors. These descriptive statistics consist of
frequency tables for categorical variables and measures of central tendency, including the
mean, and measures of variability for continuous measures.
Normalizing Variables
Examining data prior to analysis to test for outliers, normality and shape of the
distribution is necessary to understand and interpret the results (Hair, Black, Babin
&Anderson, 2010, p.77). Outliers are common in data and can have a substantial effect
on the results. To detect and modify extreme observations, Winsorizing provides the
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benefit of setting all outliers to a specified percentile of the data while retaining the
ordering of the data and providing more robust estimators. For example, a 90%
Winsorization would typically set all values above the 95th percentile of a variable to the
95th percentile and all values below the 5th percentile of the variable to the 5th percentile.
Winsorizing involves the calculation of the mean after replacing given parts of a
probability distribution or sample at the high and low end with the most extreme
remaining values, typically doing so for an equal amount of both extremes.
Steps are taken in order to normalize the three continuous dependent variables
used in these analyses (time spent on due diligence, percentage of wealth invested, and
amount of post-investment interaction). All of these variables are first Winsorized to
help produce a greater level of normality, which is an assumption of many of the tests
conducted. Winsorization often replaces 10 to 25 percent of the ends (Tukey, 1977);
however, in the AIPP data, due to very few extreme outliers, only 2.5 percent of the ends
are replaced in the Winsorization. By Winsorizing the number of hours of due diligence,
a reasonable estimate of central tendency is determined by excluding the one angel
investor with 5,000 hours of reported due diligence. Although Winsorization of the
number of hours of due diligence is useful, the percent of wealth and amount of postinvestment interaction is not impacted much with Winsorization; thus their Winsorized
versions were not utilized.
Missing data are a part of almost all research. There are several reasons data may
be missing. They may be missing because data were entered incorrectly, equipment
malfunctioned, or the respondent did not want to answer. For example, this dataset
contains the year of birth, which is used for determining the age of the respondent at the

56

time of the investment. In one case, a zero was entered; therefore, it was recoded as
missing. One respondent entered date of birth as “69,” which was recoded as 1969. One
respondent listed 2005 as birth year. Because this is not logical, it was recoded as
missing. On respondent level of education, the choices are 1=Bachelor’s, 2=Master’s,
3=JD, and 4=Ph.D. After consulting with Rob Wiltbanks, the author of the survey, it was
determined that no angels selected the option for high school, which was also available.
Listwise deletion was utilized as the treatment for missing data.
Analysis
Hypothesis 1.
Poisson regression.
The first hypothesis focused upon the impact of demographics, experience, and
risk tolerance on the time spent on due diligence. The demographic factors include age,
gender, and education level. The measures of investor experience consist of years spent
investing, years as an entrepreneur, number of firms founded, total number of previous
investments, total number of previous exits, and years of work experience within the
same industry as the investment. The model also included as risk tolerance predictors the
angel investor’s assessment of top management team (TMT) experience, whether the
TMT is perceived as a strategic risk, the stage of the venture, and the number of coinvestors, with number of hours spent on due diligence as the dependent variable.
Poisson regression was utilized in this analysis as it was beneficial in modeling
count data with a Poisson distribution. Given only the average rate of time spent on due
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diligence for a certain investment and assuming the mix of processes was random, the
Poisson distribution specifies how likely it was that the due diligence time would be 15,
20, 25 or any other number of hours during one period of the observation. The Poisson
regression thereby predicts the degree of spread around a known average rate of time
spent on due diligence.
When data are in the form of counts, researchers often utilize suboptimal
strategies, such as rescaling into categories such as 0-10, 10-20, and more than 20.
Gardner, Mulvey, and Shaw (1995) suggest that reducing counts to categories wastes
information, may dilute statistical power, and might affect results by the choice of cut-off
point for the categories. The problems using linear regression with rate data is that the
linear regression model has both the wrong model for the relationship between the
predictors and the expected values of the counts and the relationship between the
expected values and variances of the counts. Linear regression could possibly lead to
wrong inferences about the predictors (Aitchison, & Dunsmore, 1980, p.114; Gardner,
Mulvey & Shaw, 1995).
Hypothesis 2.
Tobit regression.
The second hypothesis focused upon whether a relationship exists between angel
investor decision factors and the percent of wealth invested. The same predictors were
included in these analyses as in the previous model, which consist of demographic
measures and measures for investor experience and risk tolerance.
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The Tobit analysis assumes that the dependent variable has a number of its values
clustered at some minimum value and provides a technique to utilize all observations
(including those at the limit and above it) to estimate a regression line. Other techniques
estimate a line with the observations above the limit (Tobin, 1958).
Logistic regression.
A logistic regression was used to estimate the factors that influence the percent of
wealth invested. The logit model was useful since the dependent variable is categorical
and there were multiple independent variables. The logistic regression has the advantage
when normality of variables is not met. It is also useful in cases where the participation
data are not continuous or distributed normally. Thus, logistic regression does not face
the strict assumptions and is more robust when the assumptions are not met (Hair, Black,
Babin, & Anderson, 2010, p. 317-319).
Ordinary least squares (OLS).
Ordinary least squares (OLS) was utilized in analysis of the second hypothesis.
The OLS estimation procedure provided a prediction of the dependent variable, percent
of wealth invested, for each observation in the data. The procedure set the regression
weights to minimize residuals. This allowed calculation of a single predicted value of the
dependent variable regardless of the number of independent variables in the regression
model. Thus, the predicted value represented the total of all effects of the regression and
allowed the residuals to be used as a diagnostic measure for the overall regression model
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(Hair, Black, Babin, & Anderson, 2010, p. 198). The benefit of the OLS regression result
is in forecasting or predicting the percent of wealth to be invested in a project.
Hypothesis 3.
Poisson regression.
The third hypothesis focused upon the impact of demographics, experience, and
risk tolerance on the amount of post-investment interaction between the angel and the
venture. The demographic factors include age, gender, and education level. The
measures of investor experience consist of years spent investing, years as an
entrepreneur, number of firms founded, total number of previous investments, total
number of previous exits, and years of work experience within the same industry as in the
investment. The model also included as risk tolerance predictors the angel investor’s
assessment of top management team experience, whether the TMT was perceived as a
strategic risk, the stage of the venture, and the number of co-investors, with the number
of interactions per year as the dependent variable.
Tobit regression.
The third hypothesis examined the relationship between angel investor decision
factors and the amount of post-investment interaction an angel performed. The same
predictors were included in these analyses as in the previous models, which consisted of
demographic measures and measures associated with investor experience risk tolerance.
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Ordinary least squares (OLS).
OLS regression was also used as a robustness test of the third hypothesis. The
OLS estimation procedure provided a prediction of the dependent variable, amount of
interaction, for each observation in the data. The OLS regression result was beneficial in
forecasting or predicting the amount of interaction that will be performed in an
investment.
Summary
The focus of this analysis was on angel investor decision factors that might
influence angel investors to invest in projects, as well as factors that influence amount of
time spent on due diligence and post-investment interaction. The purpose of the present
study was to better understand the role of behavioral finance influences and angel
investors. The findings of this study may be generalizable to other investors who make
decisions without the use of professional portfolio advisors. Additionally, having a better
understanding of angel investor decisions with relation to the amount of time spent on
due diligence might provide insights into important factors that should be considered
when assessing the effectiveness of pre-investment decision processes among angel
investors. Finally, further study into due diligence may offer additional insights into
information asymmetry.
The data set utilized in this study consisted of responses from 86 investor groups
with a total of 539 investors who made 3097 investments from 1972 through 2007. A
series of descriptive statistics are conducted initially. The first hypothesis included in this
study focused upon the relationship between angel investor decision factors and their due
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diligence decisions. A Poisson regression was estimated in order to test this hypothesis.
This analysis included due diligence as the outcome measure and incorporated angel
demographics, variables focusing on angel experience, variables focusing upon
assessment of TMT experience, perceived TMT risk, stage of the investment, number of
co-investors, and source of the deal as predictors. The second hypothesis tested in this
study focused upon the relationship between the foregoing angel investor behavioral
factors and the percent of personal wealth an angel invested in a project. A Tobit
regression was estimated in order to explore this hypothesis. Following this, logistic
regression and a linear regression were conducted as robustness checks. The third
hypothesis focused on the amount of post-investment interaction between the angel
investor and the firm and the above angel investor behavioral factors. A Tobit regression
was utilized in this estimation. Logistic regression and an OLS regression were estimated
as robustness tests.

CHAPTER 4 – RESULTS

This chapter presents the results of the study. Because there are no legal reporting
requirements for angel investors, insight into their decision-making process is sparse.
This dissertation utilizes data from angel investors who are members of groups.
Responses were received from 539 angel investors in eighty-six angel investor groups.
Initially, a series of descriptive statistics were reported to provide a description of the
data set as well as the individuals included in the study. A series of regression analyses
was performed focusing on the following outcomes: amount of time spent on due
diligence, percentage of wealth invested, and respondent’s level of interaction with the
company. Additionally, correlations were estimated between the respondent’s level of
interaction with the company and due diligence.
Descriptive Statistics
Table 1 defines the variables utilized in the analyses. Table 2 summarizes
descriptive statistics of the continuous variables, including sample size, mean, standard
deviation, minimum, and maximum.
Table 2 reports descriptive statistics for due diligence and percentage of wealth
invested, with and without Winsorizing. Winsorizing was particularly useful in
analyzing the number of hours of due diligence because of outliers. Of 277 angel
investors responding to the due diligence question, the mean hours of due diligence is
60.6 hours with a standard deviation of 317.7 hours. However, one angel investor
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reported 5,000 hours, and three reported 1,000 hours. These outliers influence the
reported hours of due diligence. Because the data distribution reflected very small
samples of respondents with a large range of hours of due diligence, the Winsorized
version of the number of hours of due diligence was less sensitive to outliers, yet still
provided a reasonable estimate of central tendency. The mean hours of due diligence
after Winsorizing was 34.3 with a standard deviation of 48.8 hours.
Though the percentage of wealth an angel invested was not affected significantly
by extreme outliers, for comparison the Winsorized version of percent of wealth is also
depicted. The number of hours spent on due diligence was determined by asking the
angel investor what is the “number of hours you spent on due diligence before
investing?” The average respondent spent close to 61 hours on due diligence prior to
investing, with a substantial variation in due diligence (per the standard deviation and
range). The percentage of wealth invested has a mean of 14%, and a substantial variation
(per the standard deviation and range). The number of post-investment interactions has a
mean of close to 61 times per year, and a substantial variation.
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Table 1
Summary of Variables
Variable

Description

Diligence

Number of hours of due diligence this investor conducted prior to
making their investment

Wealthpercent

Percentage of their personal wealth the angel investor held in angel
investments

Interaction
(times per year)

Frequency of interaction (times per year) this angel investor had
with this company: 365 =daily, 52 = weekly, 12 = monthly,
4 = quarterly, 1 = annually, 0 = rarely if at all

Demographics
log_age

Log of age at time of investment

gender

1 = male

edlevel

Highest level of education achieved by the angel investor: 1 =
Bachelor's, 2 = Master's, 3 = JD, 4 = PhD

Angel Investor Experience
yearsinv

Number of years that the angel investor has been investing

yearsentre

Number of years that the angel investor has been an entrepreneur

numfounded

Number of firms the angel investor previously founded

totalinv

Total number of angel investments that the respondent has made

totalexits

Total number of angel investment exits that the respondent has
experienced

TMT _experience

TMT_experience = 1 if: foundedledteam, earliersuccessteam,
largfirmexpteam, techexpteam, mgmtexpteam, salesexpteam;
otherwise 0

mgmtexpteam

Angel investor's assessment of the top management’s experience
as one of top three risks at the time of their investment, 1 = yes
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Stage of the venture at the time of investment
1= yes, this venture was in the seed stage at the time of the
Stage: Seed
Investment
1=yes, this venture was in the startup stage at the time of the
Stage: Startup
Investment

Syndication
Co-investors

Number of other co-investors that joined in the investment in this
venture at the time this angel investor invested.

Source
sourcegroupscreen

This angel investor “sourced” this venture investment from
the initial screening meeting of their group, 1 = yes; otherwise 0

Mean respondent age was slightly above 62 years, with the youngest respondent
being 34 years of age and the oldest 87. On average, the respondents had spent slightly
over 10 years investing at the time these data were collected, with a range from no
experience to 49 years of experience. Mean time spent as an entrepreneur was slightly
over 15 years, with a range from 0 to 50 years. Mean number of firms founded was
slightly below three, with a range between 0 to 23 firms. The average respondent made
close to 13 total investments, with a range from zero to 200 investments. An angel
investor exit occurs when the investment is considered to end. These so-called “exits”
include acquisitions by other companies or other investors, initial public offerings, and
firm closures during the investment. These data represent exits that spanned the last two
decades (with most exits occurring since 2004). The mean number of exits was slightly
above five, with a range between 0 and 50.
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Table 2
Descriptive Statistics: Continuous Variables
Variable

N

Mean

SD

Min

Max

Due Diligence

277

60.625

317.696

0

5000

Due Diligence (Winsorized)

277

34.325

48.850

2

200

Wealth Percent

716

13.901

15.781

0

100

Wealth Percent (Winsorized)

716

13.652

14.664

1
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Interaction (times/year)

289

60.760

123.232

0

365

Age

788

62.481

9.708

34

87

Age (Log)

788

4.122

0.163

3.526

4.466

Years Investing

814

10.484

9.381

0

49

Years Entrepreneur

769

15.293

11.028

0

50

N Firms Founded

769

2.860

3.388

0

23

Total Investments

885

12.954

16.143

0

200

Total Exits

949

5.148

9.608

0

50

Outcomes

Predictors

Table 3 reports descriptive statistics for categorical variables. A frequency table
was constructed reporting the sample sizes and percentages associated with each category
of response for each variable. An angel investor’s continued interaction with a company
after the initial investment consists of coaching, mentoring, financial monitoring, and
other forms of assistance. Responses to the amount of interaction consisted of daily,
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weekly, monthly, quarterly, annually, or rarely/never. The category most commonly
cited for interaction between the angel investor and the company was quarterly, with
slightly over 28% of respondents providing this response. The least noted category was
annually (slightly above 7%).
Approximately 87% of the sample was male. Nearly 55% of respondents had a
Master’s degree, 28% a Bachelor’s degree, 10% a Ph.D., and 6% a JD. Only
approximately 10% of respondents had some level of managerial experience, with most
not having any. VC investment measured whether this venture took on venture capital
prior to the exit event. This was found to be the case in approximately 15% of cases.
Angel investors sourced the venture from a screening meeting of an angel group close to
65% of the time.
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Table 3
Descriptive Statistics: Categorical Variables
Measure

N

%

Female

105

13.08

Male

698

86.92

Total

803

100.00

Bachelors

213

28.44

Masters

413

55.14

JD

47

6.28

PHD

76

10.15

Total

749

100.00

Gender

Education

Top Management Team (TMT) Experience
No

1,163

90.09

Yes

128

Total

1,291

100.00

No

1,166

90.32

Yes

125

Total

1,291

9.91

Stage: Seed

9.68
100.00
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Stage: Startup
No

1,118

86.60

Yes

173

13.40

Total

1,291

100.00

Source: Group Screening
No

188

35.40

Yes

343

64.60

Total

531

100.00

Initial Models
This analysis utilized those variables necessary to examine the influencers of
angel investor behavior based on the literature. Because data concerning angel investing
are difficult to attain—and the data set used here is the largest dataset available—this
analysis with observations ranging from 134 to 641 compares favorably with other
studies, such as Goldfarb, Hoberg, Kirsch, and Triantis (2009), which utilizes 32 angel
investments, and Chua and Wu (2009) using a sample size of 57.
Poisson and Tobit regressions were estimated, along with logistic regressions and
OLS regressions. The logistic regressions and OLS regressions were primarily conducted
for purposes of robustness tests. While these results are not reported in this chapter, the
analyses can be found in Appendix B. Inferences based on the supplemental analysis are
similar to those described subsequently, suggesting the results are robust across empirical
specifications.
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Panels A and B of Table 4 summarize the results of the Poisson regressions, with
due diligence as the outcome. In panel A, six models were estimated in total, first with
all experience variables and then with each measure of experience separately. The
pseudo R2 ranged from 0.03 to 0.18.
With regard to the model conducted with all experience variables, the coefficients
on the log of age, the number of years spent as an entrepreneur, the number of firms
founded, and the total number of exits are statistically significant. A statistically
significant change in due diligence was found to be associated with reduced age, as well
as a greater number of years spent as an entrepreneur, a greater number of firms founded,
and a greater number of total exits taken. Specifically, for each additional year of age,
the angel performs approximately one hour less of due diligence.
The second model in panel A included only years of investing experience out of
all experience variables. In this model, log of age failed to achieve statistical
significance, but statistical significance was indicated with respect to the number of years
spent investing. Specifically, a statistically significant change in due diligence was
associated with a greater number of years spent investing. In this model, respondent
gender was also found to achieve statistical significance: male investors spent a greater
amount of time on due diligence than female investors. The remaining models in panel A
also indicated males spent an average of about 16-17 hours more on due diligence than
females. For each additional year of investing experience, angels spent one additional
hour on due diligence.
The subsequent model focused on years spent as an entrepreneur. Statistical
significance was found with respect to the log of age, and respondent gender, as well as

71

the number of years spent as an entrepreneur. Specifically, a statistically significant
change in due diligence was associated with reduced respondent age, male respondents,
and a greater number of years as an entrepreneur. For each additional year an angel has
spent as an entrepreneur, they perform about 1.3 hours in additional due diligence.
The fourth model focused on the number of firms founded. Statistical
significance was obtained for respondent gender as well as the number of firms founded.
As in the previous models, male respondents were found to spend a greater amount of
time on due diligence as compared with female respondents, and a greater number of
firms founded was associated with augmented due diligence. The number of firms
previously founded indicated that for each additional firm the angel had founded resulted
in around 2.3 to 3 additional hours of time spent on due diligence.
The following model focused on the total number of investments. Statistical
significance was again found for respondent gender and also indicated with respect to the
total number of investments made. The results of this analysis indicated that a greater
amount of due diligence was associated with male respondents as well as a greater total
number of investments.
In the final model in panel A, total exits were focused on among the set of
experience measures. Findings of this analysis indicated that a statistically significant
change in due diligence was associated with male respondents compared with female
respondents, and greater due diligence was related to a greater number of total exits
experienced. The discrete change in probability for each of the values observed is the
average marginal effects (AME). The AME reflects for each additional exit the angel has
experienced, he will perform and about 1.4 additional hours of due diligence.
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These results suggest that angel investors’ years investing, years entrepreneurial
experience, number of firms founded, total previous investments, and total exits influence
angels to conduct more time on due diligence. These results are inconsistent with prior
studies that suggest entrepreneurs are more susceptible to cognitive biases than are nonentrepreneurs (Busenitz & Barney, 1997; Forbes, 2005). Busenitz and Barney (1997)
contend that “those who are more susceptible to the use of biases and heuristics in
decision making are the very ones who are most likely to become entrepreneurs.” These
cognitive biases are thought processes that include erroneous assumptions and inferences
and are a natural and common phenomenon. Although these biases and heuristics
represent shortcuts that can help deal with large volumes of information, they can
interfere with effective decision making. Biases and heuristics associated with additional
experience should have indicated less time on due diligence as experiences increased.
Research has not concluded whether entrepreneurs are a “certain kind of
individual” inclined to favor instinct and spontaneity, or if entrepreneurs are accustomed
to resorting to cognitive biases when experiencing conditions of information overload,
high uncertainty, and time pressure (Forbes, 2005). In the case of angel investors, prior
experience as an entrepreneur, a greater number of firms founded, a greater number of
investments, and a greater number of total exits may have provided sufficient exposure to
the challenges of new start-ups, thus tempering angels’ initial judgment about their
knowledge and overcoming their potential susceptibility to overconfidence bias.
Given that younger angel investors performed more time on due diligence than
older angel investors, younger angel investors may have had less time than their older
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counterparts to develop biases or may have realized the impact of judgmental errors on
their overall portfolio, thereby mitigating their tendency to overestimate their knowledge.
Education was not significant in the models. This may be due to a lack of
variation in education of the angel investors in our sample, as almost all investors in our
sample have a high level of education. The lowest level reported by responding angels
was a Bachelor’s degree.
In the Table 4 regressions, an angel investor’s time spent on due diligence
changed dynamically with his experience level. Younger angels with less experience
performed more due diligence prior to investing. Then, the results suggest that angel
investors with more experience perform more due diligence. This could be interpreted as
angels were not overconfident when they began to invest and thus performed more due
diligence. Then, as the angels aged and gained experience, they performed less due
diligence. Finally, they tended to develop a more realistic assessment of their abilities as
they gained increased experience through their years as an entrepreneur, the number of
firms founded, and the number of exits experienced. This finding is consistent with
Gervais and Odean (2001), who find that traders become overconfident, learn about their
abilities, and then better recognize their true ability later.

Table 4 Panel A
Due Diligence - Poisson regressions

Variable

model with
all
experience
variables

Gender

-1.18**
(-2.17)
[-40.15]
0.26
(1.26)

Education

-0.08
(-0.85)

Years Investing

0.01
(0.77)

Age (Log)

Years Entrepreneur

0.02**
(2.21)
[0.83]

with yearsinv
experience
only
-0.58
(-1.08)
0.47**
(2.32)
[15.70]
-0.06
(-0.59)

with
yearsentre
experience
only

with
numfounded
experience
only

with totalinv
experience
only

with
totalexits
experience
only

-1.02*
(-1.92)
[-34.64]
0.48**
(2.24)
[16.45]
-0.09
(-0.92)

-0.24
(-0.49)

-0.22
(-0.42)

-0.25
(-0.48)

0.52**
(2.47)
[17.59]
-0.06
(-0.52)

0.47**
(2.38)
[16.23]
-0.03
(-0.31)

0.49**
(2.38)
[16.82]
-0.03
(-0.30)

0.03***
(3.07)
[1.01]
0.04***
(3.83)
[1.32]
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N Firms
Founded
Total
Investments

0.07***
(4.03)
[2.31]
-0.02
(-0.97)

0.09***
(5.41)
[3.04]
0.01**
(2.23)
[0.50]

0.04**
(1.97)
[1.39]
7.64***
(3.55)

5.32**
(2.52)

6.86***
(3.31)

3.87**
(1.99)

3.92*
(1.85)

0.04***
(4.15)
[1.38]
4.01**
(1.98)

Observations

246

248

249

249

247

249

Pseudo R2

0.18

0.07

0.11

0.13

0.03

0.05

Total Exits
Constant

Note: A single asterisk (*) indicates that the estimate is significant at the 10-percent level, a double asterisk (**)
indicates significance at the 5-percent level, and a triple asterisk (***) indicates significance at the 1-percent level.
Robust z-statistics are in parentheses. AMEs - average marginal effects are the discrete changes from the base
levels and are displayed in brackets [ ] for statistically significant coefficients.
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Next, panel B of Table 4 reports the results of the Poisson regression models on
due diligence with additional predictors. As before, the outcome measure in all models is
the number of hours on due diligence. Here, three Poisson models were estimated in
total, consisting of the following: a model focusing on demographics, angel investor’s
experience, angel perception of the TMT experience, and number of co-investors. Then a
model with the same variables as the first model along with the stage of the investment
and whether the angel perceived the TMT as a strategic risk at the time of the investment
was performed. Finally, a model that consisted of demographics, angel experience, angel
perception of the TMT experience, number of co-investors, stage of the investment when
the angel invested, and source of the investment as predictors was tested. The pseudo R2
for the panel B regressions were 0.19, 0.28 and 0.27, respectively.
With regard to the first model with additional variables, statistical significance
was indicated with respect to the log of respondent age, years spent as an entrepreneur,
and number of firms founded. Results of this model indicated a statistically significant
change in due diligence was associated with reduced respondent age, a greater number of
years spent as an entrepreneur, and a greater number of firms founded which led to more
time spent on due diligence. Specifically, for each additional year of age, the angel
investor performed about 45 minutes less on due diligence. For each additional year as
an entrepreneur, the angel performed almost an additional hour on due diligence. And,
for each additional firm the angel had founded, he performed a little over 2 hours
additional due diligence.
The second Poisson regression model conducted focused on management and
stage of the investment risk. In this model, statistical significance was indicated with
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respect to the log of respondent age, number of years spent investing, number of firms
founded, and greater perceived strategic risk posed by the management team, as well as
seed stage and startup stage measures. Findings of this model indicated a statistically
significant change in due diligence was associated with reduced respondent age, a greater
number of years spent investing, a greater number of firms founded, and a greater
perceived strategic risk as posed by the management team, as well as the venture not
being in the seed or startup stages. The AME indicate that for each additional year of
investing experience, the angel spends about an additional hour and 20 minutes on due
diligence. When the angel perceives the TMT to be a strategic risk, he perform about 20
additional hours on due diligence. When the investment is in the seed stage, angels
perform about 22 hours less due diligence. When the investment is in the startup stage,
the angel performs about 26 hours less due diligence. The reduced due diligence in these
stages may be a result of less financial data to examine due to the early stages.
The third model estimated incorporated group screening as a source measure. If
the source of the investment was determined through the angel group’s initial screening
efforts versus from a referral from a friend, referral from a professional, or a previous
working relationship, then the deal might have more information asymmetry.
In this model, statistical significance was indicated with respect to number of
years spent investing, number of firms founded, and source being a group screening.
Specifically, for each year of investing experience, the angel spent about an additional
hour on due diligence. When the deal source was a group screening the angel spent about
22 less hours on due diligence.
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These results also suggest that younger angel investors spent more time on due
diligence than older angel investors. Angels with more experience spend more time on
due diligence, perhaps because they are more aware of the importance of due diligence.
Angels investing after a group screening performed less due diligence, which may
indicate that group screening allows more efficient due diligence. It is also possible that
angels were motivated by something other than reducing information asymmetry and
increasing return on investment. Their decisions might have been affected by more status
or social responsibility associated with committing to an investment with their peer
angels. Angels might have been willing to accept more risk to achieve such goals (i.e.,
Statman, 2008).
The influence of herding behavior is also considered. This behavior would be
characterized by whether or not angels were influenced by other angels investing in a
project. If investors commit errors only at an individual level, then the error would be
neutralized given they are randomly distributed, causing the angel investing market to be
efficient. However, if after a group presentation, the individual investors decide to invest
based on the group behavior that may have contained errors, this investing behavior - that
increases based on the number of previous adopters - is known as herding and is based on
cognitive error and is irrational (Szyszka, 2008; Welch, 1999). The final due diligence
model in panel B indicates that the number of co-investors is significant; however, angels
perform more due diligence when more investors are involved; thus, herding behavior
does not appear to be an influence in due diligence decisions.
Angel investors rely on deal referrals from many sources. Some sources may be
more informationally reliable than others, thus reducing investment risk (Aram, 1989;
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Wetzel, 1986). Angel investors in this case did not expect to be defrauded and were not
what finance theorists would consider “rational expectations” investors; rather, they were
“trusting investors” (Stout, 2010). Trust is an important force in explaining investor
behavior, and many investors base their investments on trust. However, the trust model
of behavior explains bubbles by suggesting that they occur when investors do not pay
attention to fundamentals (Stout, 2010). In this model, angel investors perform less due
diligence when the deal was sourced from a group screening.
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Table 4 - Panel B
Due Diligence - Poisson regressions
model with
additional
variables

mgmtrisk

source

-1.19*
(-1.89)
[-39.25]
0.17
(0.54)

-0.97
(-1.53)

Gender

-1.14*
(-1.92)
[-39.54]
0.02
(0.08)

Education

-0.00
(-0.04)

-0.08
(-0.69)

-0.00
(-0.04)

Years Investing

0.00
(0.20)
0.02*
(1.81)
[0.82]
0.07***
(4.01)
[2.39]
-0.00
(-0.31)

0.04**
(2.22)
[1.35]
0.02
(1.29)

0.03**
(2.24)
[1.11]
0.02
(1.05)

0.06***
(3.07)
[2.05]
0.00
(0.31)

0.05***
(3.16)
[1.69]
0.01
(0.87)

Total Exits

0.01
(0.53)

-0.02
(-0.93)

-0.03
(-1.18)

TMT Experience

-0.07
(-0.39)

-0.34
(-1.34)

-0.26
(-1.01)

Variable

Age (Log)

Years Entrepreneur

N Firms Founded

Total Investments

Management Risk

0.61**
(2.43)
[20.13]

-0.05
(-0.19)
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Stage: Seed

Stage: Startup
-0.04
(-1.47)

Co-investors

-0.67**
(-2.57)
[-22.18]
-0.79***
(-2.93)
[-26.04]
-0.01
(-0.25)

-0.27
(-1.10)
-0.37
(-1.51)
-0.01
(-0.34)

7.77***
(3.24)

8.00***
(3.13)

-0.69**
(-2.39)
[-22.08]
4.73
(1.27)

Observations

193

135

164

Pseudo R2

0.19

0.28

0.27

Source: Group Screening
Constant

Note: A single asterisk (*) indicates that the estimate is significant at the 10percent level, a double asterisk (**) indicates significance at the 5-percent
level, and a triple asterisk (***) indicates significance at the 1-percent level.
Robust z-statistics are in parentheses. AMEs - average marginal effects are the
discrete changes from the base levels and are displayed in brackets [ ] for
statistically significant coefficients.

Summarized in panels A and B of Table 5 are results of the Tobit regressions
focusing on the percentage of wealth invested. Panel A consisted of six Tobit regression
models: a model with all experience variables, with solely years investing experience,
with solely years spent as an entrepreneur experience, with solely the number of firms
founded experience, with solely the total number of investments experience, and with
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solely the total exits experience. Panel A of Table 5 had a pseudo R2 range from 0.01 to
0.03.
First, with regard to the Tobit regression model conducted with all experience
variables, statistical significance was indicated with respect to the log of respondent age,
number of years spent investing, number of years spent as an entrepreneur, number of
firms founded, and total number of investments. Specifically, a statistically significant
change in percentage of wealth invested was associated with reduced respondent age, a
greater number of years spent investing, a greater number of years spent as an
entrepreneur, a greater number of firms founded, and a greater number of total
investments.
The second model focused specifically on number of years of investing
experience. In this model, statistical significance was indicated with respect to the log of
respondent age and respondent gender, as well as the number of years spent investing. A
statistically significant change in percentage of wealth invested was associated with
reduced respondent age, male respondents, and a greater number of years spent investing.
The number of years spent as an entrepreneur was the focus of the third model.
Age and gender were again found to achieve statistical significance, as well as the
number of years spent as an entrepreneur. Specifically, a greater percentage of wealth
invested was associated with reduced respondent age and male respondents. A greater
percentage of wealth invested was also associated with a greater number of years spent as
an entrepreneur.
The fourth Tobit regression model focused on the number of firms founded
among the predictors relating to experience. Significance was indicated with respect to
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respondent age and gender, and the number of firms founded was also found to achieve
statistical significance in this model. As in the previous two models, a greater percentage
of wealth invested was found to be associated with reduced respondent age and male
respondents, as well as a greater number of firms founded.
In the fifth model, the total number of investments was focused on among the set
of predictors associated with investing experience. Statistical significance was indicated
with respect to respondent age and gender, as in the previous three models, and
significance was also found for the total number of investments made. The results with
respect to respondent age and gender were in the same direction as the previous three
models, with a greater percentage of wealth invested associated with reduced respondent
age and male respondents. Furthermore, it was also indicated that a greater number of
total investments was associated with an increased percentage of wealth invested.
The final model in panel A focused on the total number of exits with respect to
the set of predictors associated with investing experience. In this model, significance was
again indicated with respect to respondent age and gender, and significance was shown
with respect to the total number of exits. A greater percentage of wealth invested was
again associated with reduced respondent age and male respondents, with a greater
number of total exits also found to be associated with a greater percentage of wealth
invested.
Younger angel investors invested a larger percentage of their wealth; however,
this may be a factor of not having as much total wealth as older investors. Experience
associated with years investing, years an entrepreneur, and the number of firms founded
appeared to contribute to angel confidence in investing a larger percentage of wealth in
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an investment. However, these experience variables were also associated with greater
due diligence, therefore, possibly confirming that angels are learning from their
experiences, performing more due diligence and investing a larger percentage of wealth
as they gain experience.

Table 5 - Panel A
Percentage of Wealth - Tobit regressions

Variable

Age (Log)
Gender
Education
Years Investing
Years
Entrepreneur
N Firms Founded
Total
Investments
Total Exits
Constant

model with all
experience
variables

with yearsinv
experience
only

with yearsentre
experience
only

with
numfounded
experience
only

with totalinv
experience
only

with totalexits
experience
only

-24.19***
(-5.81)
0.78
(0.71)
0.06
(0.09)
0.62***
(6.01)
0.10*
(1.92)
0.76***
(2.97)
0.20*
(1.93)
-0.20
(-1.29)
101.39***
(5.99)

-20.10***
(-4.96)
1.95*
(1.73)
0.60
(0.89)
0.78***
(8.16)

-20.52***
(-4.78)
2.83**
(2.13)
-0.04
(-0.05)

-12.63***
(-3.04)
2.97**
(2.33)
-0.46
(-0.65)

-12.84***
(-2.76)
2.52*
(1.89)
0.17
(0.22)

-12.80***
(-3.04)
2.83**
(2.18)
0.32
(0.40)

0.44***
(7.93)
1.32***
(4.83)
0.34***
(2.86)

85.92***
(5.20)

89.35***
(5.09)

60.28***
(3.58)

60.43***
(3.25)

0.60***
(5.27)
61.16***
(3.54)
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Observations

631

637

639

639

637

641

Pseudo R2

0.03

0.03

0.01

0.01

0.01

0.01

Note: A single asterisk (*) indicates that the estimate is significant at the 10-percent level, a double asterisk (**) indicates
significance at the 5-percent level, and a triple asterisk (***) indicates significance at the 1-percent level. Robust z-statistics
in parentheses.
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Shown in panel B of Table 5 are the results of the Tobit regressions on the
percentage of wealth invested with additional independent variables. Three models were
estimated in total. First the table reports on a model focusing on demographics, angel
investor’s experience, angel perception of the TMT experience, and the number of coinvestors. Next, a model with the same variables as the first model along with the stage
of the investment and whether the angel perceived the TMT as a strategic risk at the time
of the investment was estimated. Finally, a model that consisted of demographics, angel
experience, angel perception of the TMT experience, number of co-investors, stage of the
investment when the angel invested, and the source of the investment as predictors was
estimated. The pseudo R2 in the panel B regressions were 0.05, 0.07 and 0.06,
respectively.
With regard to the first model, statistical significance was indicated with respect
to the log of respondent age, number of years spent investing, number of years the angel
had been an entrepreneur, and angel investor’s perception of TMT experience.
Specifically, a statistically significant change in the percentage of wealth invested was
found to be associated with younger investors, a greater number of years spent investing,
a greater number of years as an entrepreneur, and when the TMT was perceived to have
more experience.
In the second model in panel B, which focused on management as a strategic risk
and the stage of the investment risk, statistical significance with the log of investor age,
number of years spent investing, number of years spent as an entrepreneur, and number
of co-investors was obtained. Specifically, a greater percentage of wealth invested was
associated with reduced respondent age, a greater number of years spent investing, and a

88

reduced number of co-investors. These results suggest that herding may not be an
influence on percentage of wealth invested.
Consistent with prior literature, the results indicate that TMT experience was a
key factor in a deal (MacMillan, Zemann, & Subbanarasimha, 1987; Van Osnabrugge &
Robinson 2000). Sudek (2006) found that angel investors looked for a track record of
previous success in the TMT. Study results suggested that angels value previous
successful experience on the part of the TMT and would invest a larger percentage of
their wealth when managers fit this criterion.
Finally, in the third Tobit regression model, statistical significance was achieved
with respect to the log of respondent age, education level of the angel, number of years
spent investing, and number of years spent as an entrepreneur. In this model, it was
found that a greater percentage of wealth invested was associated with reduced
respondent age, reduced level of education, a greater number of years spent investing, a
greater number of years spent as an entrepreneur.
The results of the percentage of wealth invested analyses suggested that greater
investment was associated with a reduced angel investor age. Though this may be from
overconfidence in younger angel investors, it is more likely a result of older investors
having more total wealth. As such, the amount invested by younger investors may have
been the same as that invested by older investors; yet it likely represented a larger
percentage of their total wealth. Several studies find that both men and women exhibit
overconfidence; however, men are generally more overconfident than women (Barber &
Odean, 2001). Barber and Odean (2001) also find that men trade more often than women
and tend to have a lower investment performance. This analysis suggested male angel
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investors invested a larger percentage of wealth than females. Though a greater
percentage of wealth invested was associated with reduced level of education, it must be
noted that all the angels in this analysis were well-educated, with none of the respondents
reporting less than a bachelor’s degree.
Angel investor experience proxies, including a greater number of years spent
investing, years spent as an entrepreneur, firms founded, and total investments, resulted
in a greater percentage of wealth invested. This experience-based influence on the
decision to invest a larger percentage of wealth may have been the result of recency.
Recency refers to the situation where events that are most recent have a memory
advantage over items retrieved from long-term memory. The investor who has invested
in deals and has been successful may remember these events positively and invest in
additional deals. The influence of investor past success can lead to overconfidence, less
diversification, and more risk taking (Merkle, 2012).
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Table 5 - Panel B
Percentage of Wealth - Tobit regressions.
model with
Variable
additional
variables
Age (Log)
Gender
Education
Years Investing
Years Entrepreneur
N Firms Founded
Total Investments
Total Exits
TMT Experience

mgmtrisk

source
-18.97**
(-2.53)
-1.76
(-0.99)
-1.94*
(-1.90)
1.10***
(4.51)
0.28***
(2.82)
0.36
(1.00)
0.07
(0.41)
-0.19
(-0.68)

-0.28
(-1.39)

-17.75**
(-2.23)
-1.45
(-0.80)
-1.62
(-1.37)
1.09***
(4.71)
0.18
(1.57)
0.54
(1.54)
0.26
(1.65)
-0.33
(-1.21)
0.11
(0.03)
-0.28
(-0.13)
-1.87
(-0.57)
-1.94
(-0.75)
-0.40***
(-2.66)

100.59***
(3.58)

79.75**
(2.39)

1.20
(0.40)
-1.57
(-0.67)
-1.07
(-0.49)
-0.31
(-1.25)
2.36
(0.76)
83.79***
(2.73)

192

135

163

-23.65***
(-3.43)
-0.81
(-0.42)
-0.86
(-0.87)
0.63***
(3.25)
0.26***
(2.69)
0.39
(1.15)
0.19
(1.27)
-0.26
(-0.95)
3.99*
(1.72)

Management Risk
Stage: Seed
Stage: Startup
Co-investors
Source: Group Screening
Constant
Observations
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Pseudo R2

0.05

0.07

0.06

Note: A single asterisk (*) indicates that the estimate is significant at the 10percent level, a double asterisk (**) indicates significance at the 5-percent level,
and a triple asterisk (***) indicates significance at the 1-percent level. Robust zstatistics in parentheses.

Depicted in panels A and B of Table 6 are results of the Poisson regressions
focusing on post-investment interaction, measured as the number of interactions per year.
In panel A, six regression models were estimated: a model with all experience variables,
with solely years spent investing, with solely years spent as an entrepreneur, with solely
the number of firms founded, with solely the total number of investments, and with solely
the total number of exits with respect to the experience measures. The pseudo R2 ranged
from 0.02 to 0.17 for the regressions in panel A.
The model incorporating all experience variables revealed statistical significance
with respect to the number of years spent investing only. Specifically, a statistically
significant change in the amount of years investing, years as an entrepreneur, and number
of firms founded experience were associated with greater interaction. The second model
focused on the number of years spent investing with regard to these experience measures.
The results of this model indicated statistical significance with regard to the number of
years spent investing, with a greater amount of experience associated with more years
investing experience. For both models the average marginal effects (AME) indicate that
for each additional year of investing experience, the angel will provide approximately
three additional interactions per year with the firm.
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The third model focusing on the number of years spent as an entrepreneur
revealed that a greater number of years spent as an entrepreneur was associated with a
greater amount of interaction. The AMEs suggest that for every additional year of
entrepreneurial experience, an angel provides approximately 2.6 additional interactions
with the firm each year.
The number of firms founded was the focus of the fourth Poisson regression.
Statistical significance was obtained with regard to this predictor, with a greater number
of firms founded associated with a greater amount of interaction. The AME reflects one
additional interaction per year for each additional firm that the angel has founded. In the
final two models, focusing upon the total number of investments and the total number of
exits, respectively, no statistically significant results were found.

Table 6 Panel A
Post Investment Interaction - Poisson regressions
model with
with
all
yearsinv
Variable
experience
experience
variables
only
-0.58
0.13
Age (Log)
(-0.60)
(0.15)

with
yearsentre
experience
only
-0.02
(-0.02)

with
numfounded
experience
only
0.98
(1.02)

1.22
(1.27)

with
totalexits
experience
only
1.21
(1.26)

with totalinv
experience
only

Gender

-0.11
(-0.24)

-0.01
(-0.02)

0.12
(0.25)

0.18
(0.39)

0.17
(0.37)

0.19
(0.40)

Education

-0.04
(-0.37)

0.04
(0.35)

0.04
(0.30)

0.04
(0.29)

0.10
(0.79)

0.10
(0.78)

0.05***
(3.97)
[3.28]
0.03**
(2.09)

0.05***
(4.13)
[3.07]

Years Investing

Years Entrepreneur

N Firms Founded

0.05**
(2.33)
[2.93]

0.04***
(3.50)
[2.64]
0.06***
(2.87)
[1.06]
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Total Exits

-0.02
(-0.45)

0.01
(0.69)

5.91
(1.53)

3.00
(0.82)

3.41
(0.89)

-0.33
(-0.08)

-1.22
(-0.31)

-1.22
(-0.32)

Observations

242

244

245

245

243

245

Pseudo R2

0.17

0.10

0.08

0.05

0.02

0.02

Constant

Note: A single asterisk (*) indicates that the estimate is significant at the 10-percent level, a double asterisk (**)
indicates significance at the 5-percent level, and a triple asterisk (***) indicates significance at the 1-percent level.
Robust z-statistics are in parentheses. AMEs - average marginal effects are the discrete changes from the base
levels and are displayed in brackets [ ] for statistically significant coefficients.
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Panel B of Table 6 reports the Poisson regression results focusing upon postinvestment interaction with additional predictors. Three models similar to those in Panel
B of Table 5 were estimated. The pseudo R2 in the panel B regressions were 0.21, 0.31,
and 0.26, respectively.
With regard to the first Poisson regression model in panel B of Table 6, statistical
significance was indicated with respect to number of years spent investing, total number
of firms founded, and number of co-investors. A greater amount of post-investment
interaction was associated with greater number of years spent investing, greater number
of firms founded, and reduced number of co-investors. The AME indicate that for each
additional year of investing experience the angels have, they will provide approximately
2.7 additional interactions with the firm. For each additional firm the angel has founded,
he will provide about 2.5 additional interactions with the firm; and for each additional coinvestor that is involved in the deal, the angel will provide over six fewer post investment
interactions with the firm.
In the second regression model focusing on measures relating to management
risk and the stage of the investment as risk predictors, statistical significance was
indicated with respect to the number of years spent investing, number of years as an
entrepreneur, number of firms founded, total previous investments, and management
team perceived as a strategic risk. An increased amount of post-investment interaction
was associated with increased years investing, increased years as an entrepreneur,
increased number of firms founded, fewer total investments, and when management is
perceived a strategic risk. Specifically, the AME indicate that for each additional
investment the angel is involved in, the angel will provide approximately three less
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interactions per year. This finding may be a result of available time when angels are
involved in additional deals. The AMEs for angels reporting that they perceive the TMT
to be a strategic risk indicates that the angel will perform 55 more interactions per year.
These additional interactions may be for assistance in training the TMT or may be angels
way of monitoring. These results suggest that experience assisted the angel investor in
getting involved after the investment. This may have been to share knowledge with the
entrepreneur and assist the venture to success. Additional interaction with the venture
when the management team was perceived to be a strategic risk may suggest that angels
perceived that they were capable of training existing managers or replacing them to
insure the business succeeds. Angels investing after determining that the management
team was a strategic risk suggests that angel investors believed they could overcome the
problem, an indicator of confidence in their abilities. Contributing more post-investment
interaction when there were fewer co-investors may be out of necessity: there are fewer
co-investors to share in the responsibilities.
The final model incorporating variables associated with the source of the deal
found statistical significance with respect to the number of years investing experience.
Specifically, a greater amount of post-investment interaction was associated with the
number of years investing experience. Economically, when angel investors invest in a
deal, they will interact with the venture about 2.4 more times per year for each additional
year of investing experience they have.
In these analyses, angel investors appear to have learned from prior investing
experiences how much value they could add to the investment through providing
additional post-investment interaction. Angel investing is unique in this aspect of
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investing. Post-investment interaction is often not an option in other types of investing.
However, angels can utilize their skills and previous experiences to provide postinvestment interaction to improve the performance of the venture.
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Table 6 - Panel B
Post investment interaction - Poisson regressions
model with
additional
variables

mgmtrisk

source

Age (Log)

0.32
(0.29)

-0.22
(-0.17)

0.21
(0.18)

Gender

-0.50
(-1.38)

-0.38
(-1.16)

-0.45
(-1.18)

Education

-0.09
(-0.75)

-0.19
(-1.21)

-0.06
(-0.44)

0.04***
(2.97)
[2.69]
0.03
(1.53)

0.04**
(2.36)

0.23
(0.65)

Variable

Total Investments

0.03**
(2.12)
[2.53]
-0.01
(-0.63)

Total Exits

-0.05
(-1.13)

0.04*
(1.82)
[2.77]
0.04*
(1.73)
[3.20]
0.04*
(1.95)
[3.00]
-0.04**
(-2.16)
[-3.15]
-0.05
(-0.78)

TMT Experience

0.30
(1.11)

0.44
(1.41)

Years Investing

Years Entrepreneur

N Firms Founded

Management Risk

0.75**
(2.47)
[55.58]

0.02
(0.81)
0.03
(1.31)
-0.01
(-0.45)
-0.04
(-0.80)
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Stage: Seed

-0.62
(-1.46)

0.03
(0.07)

Stage: Startup

-0.25
(-0.63)

0.27
(0.68)

-0.06
(-1.14)

-0.07
(-1.29)

Co-investors

-0.09*
(-1.93)
[-6.26]

-0.83
(-1.62)

Source: Group Screening
3.11
(0.70)

5.23
(1.01)

3.51
(0.74)

Observations

185

134

162

Pseudo R2

0.21

0.31

0.26

Constant

Note: A single asterisk (*) indicates that the estimate is significant at the 10percent level, a double asterisk (**) indicates significance at the 5-percent level,
and a triple asterisk (***) indicates significance at the 1-percent level. Robust
z-statistics are in parentheses. AMEs - average marginal effects are the discrete
changes from the base levels and are displayed in brackets [ ] for statistically
significant coefficients..

Correlations between Interaction and Due Diligence
Finally, correlations were conducted between the measure of interaction and due
diligence. First, a Spearman’s correlation was estimated between interaction and due
diligence. This correlation is large and significant, ρ(252) = .5583, p < .001. This result
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indicated that a greater amount of time spent on due diligence was associated with more
frequent interaction. Another Spearman’s correlation was estimated for post-investment
interaction and due diligence with the Winsorized version of due diligence. An almost
identical result was obtained, ρ(252) = .5582, p < .001.
Summary
This chapter presented the results of the study. Initially, a series of descriptive
statistics were computed. The focus of these analyses was on measures of central
tendency and variability for the continuous items included in the investigation. Also
included was a frequency table, reporting the sample sizes and percentages associated
with each response category for the categorical measures. Then, several sets of
regression analyses were estimated focusing on the outcome variables of number of hours
spent on due diligence, percentage of wealth invested, and level of interaction the angel
investor had with the company. Spearman correlations were also conducted between the
level of post-investment interaction and due diligence. Overall, significant results are
found in the regression models. Findings will be discussed in further detail in the
following chapter, which will also serve to relate these findings to previous literature and
theory.

CHAPTER 5 – DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

This chapter discusses the results vis-a-vis previous literature and theory, and also
notes study limitations and avenues for future research. Findings of this investigation
provide important implications with regard to germane extant literature and theory.
Examination of the decisions of angel investors enhances our understanding of alternative
investor situations where investors make risky decisions without the benefit of
professional portfolio advisors. The individual investor, or angel in this case, instead of
relying on a professional advisor, may have a tendency to rely on biases and heuristics to
simplify risky decisions.

Discussion

Several distinct patterns of results are found regarding percentage of wealth
invested. Older investors are associated with a reduced percentage of wealth invested.
Also, higher values for years investing, years as an entrepreneur, number of firms
founded, and number of angel investments are associated with a higher percentage of
wealth invested. Number of years as an entrepreneur is consistently associated with
increased due diligence, as is number of firms founded. Future researchers are cautioned
against using age as an experience measure in angel investing, as angel investors not only
skew older; but also experience related variables in angel investing are difficult to
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disentangle from age. For example, as an angel get older, he will have more years
investing, more years as an entrepreneur, and more exits.
The results of these analyses suggest that demographics and investor experience
appear to be important determinants of due diligence. The greater number of firms
founded and greater number of years as an entrepreneur suggest expertise in
entrepreneurship. Much of the literature on expertise suggests that biases and heuristics
influence experts in many areas (Gilovich, Griffin, & Kahneman, 2002). Miscalibration is
often reported in expert opinion, often resulting in overconfidence. Miscalibration is the
tendency to believe that information is more accurate than it actually is and can lead to
poor judgment. However, education and investing experience are helpful in reducing
biases (Agnew & Szykman, 2005). The current results seemingly support this conjecture.
Angels tend to be highly educated, and those with more years as an entrepreneur and
investment experience spend more time on due diligence; such efforts should reduce the
effect of miscalibration and overconfidence.
Use of heuristics, or shortcuts, to search for solutions often involves biases that
can be large. These biases can shape the nature of heuristics. Sometimes simple
heuristics that require relatively little calculation effort, known as “fast and frugal”
heuristics, may be efficient if the decision environment is unchanged. However, such
heuristics may not perform well if all alternatives are not similar and they involve some
overly familiar factors (Gigerenzer, 2004).
Because angel investors are generally wealthy, examination of biases and other
influences on their investment decisions is appropriate. Bias associated with
overconfidence and recency/primacy is indicated by angels investing larger percentages
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of their wealth when they have more years of experience as an entrepreneur, more
investing experience, and a larger number of investments. Recent success in an
investment, or a previous similar investment that was very successful, may influence the
percent of wealth decision. The decision may also be a result of the overconfidence bias
resulting from past success in business. The tendency to take too much credit for their
past successes might well lead to overconfidence in their abilities.
The findings in this study reveal that a greater percentage of wealth invested is
associated with reduced age, as well as variables related to experience, including an
increased number of years investing, years as an entrepreneur, number of firms founded,
and number of investments. With younger investors, a smaller investment may represent
a larger portion of the investor’s total wealth.
Overconfidence did not appear to be a factor in reduced due diligence in the risky
investment of angels. The literature suggests that more successful investors are more
likely to update their beliefs; however, they overweight the possibility that their success
was from their own abilities rather than from chance or outside factors. This leads to
their becoming overconfident (Gervais & Odean, 2001). If angel investors with a greater
number of years as an entrepreneur and a larger number of firms founded are more likely
to be overconfident, we would expect them to perform less due diligence. However, we
find that such angel investors perform more due diligence. This may be because angel
investors with a greater number of years as an entrepreneur and a larger number of firms
founded have previously experienced negative results from poor diligence or that the
angel has learned how to do better due diligence over time. Another possibility is that
more experienced angels “champion” a deal to perform the due diligence for others.
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Payne and Macarty (2002) find that angel groups may have industry “experts” who
“champion” a deal and tend to conduct the investment due diligence. Their due diligence
tends to be better due diligence than they would engage in to satisfy themselves in an
effort to protect their reputation. Some “champions” may also provide due diligence
training to other angel investors to mentor them in the due diligence process, thus
engaging in additional hours of due diligence.
Deals sourced through group screenings result in decreased due diligence. The
investment in an entrepreneur’s venture indicates a trusting relationship. Trust builds on
psychology of human behavior characteristics (e.g., altruism, fairness, morality, ethics).
Blau (1964) found that social exchange “tends to engender feelings of personal
obligations, gratitude, and trust; purely economic exchange as such does not” (p.94).
Although angel investors perform less due diligence in deals sourced through group
screening, they appear to develop trust in the entrepreneur and the idea as depicted by the
investment. Angel investors are also likely to have some trust in other members of their
groups. Therefore, this analysis adds to the literature on social exchange theory and
incorporates “trust” as an additional element of a behavioral consideration between the
investor and source of the deal that influences the due diligence decision.
One of the earliest sources of a potential investment is the group screening, where
angels make an initial determination if a deal is a good fit. Analysis of the amount of
time spent on due diligence suggests that group screening is significant. However, angels
perform less due diligence when they source a deal at this initial stage. This suggests
angels may be investing based on “gut instinct” which could be a result of
overconfidence. Overconfidence is the belief that one’s personal qualities (such as ability
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to select the right deal) are better than they really are. Fischhoff (2002) suggests a
mismatch between judges and tasks may occur as a result of hindsight bias or
overconfidence. Researchers offer overconfidence as an explanation for wars, stock
market bubbles, and entrepreneurial failures (Glaser, Nöth, & Weber, 2004; Moore &
Healey, 2008). The reduced amount of time spent on due diligence when investing after
a group screening or through a referral and the increased amount of time on due diligence
with being personal friends with the entrepreneur suggest issues that involve
overconfidence bias. Barber and Odean (2001) find that overconfident investors tend to
invest more in assets with which they are familiar. Kahneman and Frederick (2002)
found that familiarity belongs to the family of recognition heuristics which “draws on
‘natural assessment’ of recognition or familiarity, may be endorsed as a deliberate
strategy, makes people look smart under some conditions, and will produce systematic
errors and biases.” Overconfidence and familiarity may lead to a tendency to overvalue
certainty or to ignore very low probabilities (Kahneman & Frederick, 2002).
Models are also estimated involving the source of the deal on time spent on due
diligence, percent of wealth, and interaction. The “source of the deal” predictors are only
found to be significant in the due diligence regression models. These results generally
suggest that when a respondent sources a deal through the initial group screening less
time is spent on due diligence. It is not necessarily irrational to spend less time on due
diligence on projects when the angel investor has superior information asymmetry.
However, lower due diligence may reflect the influence of prior experience and lead to
the use of heuristics or success or overconfidence bias. In this case, decisions may be
less than fully rational.
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Prior research suggests that due diligence decisions are affected by group
structure that allows “experts” to evaluate and monitor deals (DeGennaro, 2010; Mason
& Harrison, 2008). Investing alongside others, or syndication, can facilitate due
diligence and post-investment interaction between the angel investor and the
entrepreneur. This can add value to an investment if investors are able to share their
specific knowledge and complementary skills. Das and Teng (2002) argue that a social
exchange of controls is a process of social sanctions and cooperative culture which
typically results in all individual investors contributing to the success of the investment
through their individual strengths. Thus, social exchange theory helps explain differing
degrees of post-investment interaction between angel investors and entrepreneurs.
This study collected information on interaction reported (rarely, daily, weekly,
monthly, quarterly, and annually). High correlations are found between due diligence
and interaction between the angel and the new firm. This result indicates that a greater
amount of time spent on due diligence is associated with more frequent interaction. A
series of models include interaction as the outcome measure. Two models found that a
greater number of years investing was associated with greater interaction. Moreover, the
angel investor having sourced the investment from the presentation meeting of the group
is also related to less interaction. Angel investors can offer post-investment assistance to
the entrepreneur in many different ways, including building the management team,
assisting to further develop the entrepreneur’s idea, bringing the product to market, and
helping locate and secure future financing. Because most angel investors invest in
projects that are geographically close to their home, geographic proximity of the angel
can be a major determinant of the amount of interaction. Additionally, angels who are
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familiar with issues confronting ventures may be able to contribute more to the success of
the firm than angels who are less familiar. An example would be a physician/angel
investor may be more familiar with software relating to electronic medical records and
might provide additional hours. This same analogy may explain why an investment
sourced in a group screening may result in less overall interaction – one angel may
“champion” the deal as it is in his/her area of expertise. Correlations are also conducted
between interaction and due diligence. These correlations are found to be positive, large,
and statistically significant. Additional analysis is needed to determine the reasons for
increased time spent on due diligence and more frequent interaction. Possible rationales
might be specific knowledge of the industry as well as interest and abilities on the part of
the angel to assist the firm.

Theoretical Implications

This dissertation, while containing some similarities with the DeGennaro and
Dwyer (2011) study, also contains a number of important differences. The present study
provides a comprehensive analysis of predictors of due diligence, percentage of wealth
invested, and interaction with the company through a series of regression models.
Therefore, in these analyses, a more detailed view of the predictors of angel decisions is
ascertained. Additionally, by expanding on the analyses conducted by DeGennaro and
Dwyer (2011), the current study expands knowledge regarding behavioral influences on
angel investors.
Behavioral finance theory presents a challenge to Modern Portfolio Theory in that
within behavioral finance theory, social, cognitive, and emotional factors are considered
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to influence individual decisions of investors and provide biases that influence their
choices. Essentially, behavioral finance theory combines behavioral and cognitive
theories of psychology with conventional economics and finance in order to help explain
decisions that are made by investors (Ackert & Deaves, 2009; Ritter, 2003; Shiller,
2003). Previous study results suggest that individual investors are influenced by biases
and heuristics.
The adaptive market hypothesis is a result of the challenges that behavioral
finance provides to the efficient markets hypothesis. Essentially, this theory builds on the
psychology of human behavior, such as altruism, fairness, and ethics that create biases
and help explain market dynamics (Lo, 2004). Choices made by individuals are based on
past experience and whether these experiences provided positive or negative
reinforcement. In addition, this theory suggests that individuals develop heuristics that
assist them in adapting to economic challenges and also help them achieve optimal
solutions (Lo, 2004; Reuber & Fischer, 1994). This study finds that a greater number of
years investing is associated with greater interaction. The findings may suggest support
for the adaptive markets hypothesis, as such individuals seemingly made decisions
(previous investments) and then learned from those decisions (based on their previous
experiences); whether those previous experiences provide positive or negative
reinforcement (returns) lead angels to adapt by providing greater interaction with the
entrepreneur. This evolutionary model of individuals adapting by developing heuristics,
experienced-based techniques, allows the traditional models of Modern Portfolio Theory
to coexist with behavioral finance.

109

Study results also reveal that individuals who spent a greater number of years
investing and as an entrepreneur, and founded a larger number of firms, invest in a
greater number of angel investments. This suggests a possibility of the presence of the
diversification heuristic. The diversification heuristic suggests that some portion of
investing is driven by behavioral attributes, such as sensation seeking, “trying a little bit
of everything” when choices are not mutually exclusive, and overconfidence. For
example, sensation seekers like to try a variety of investments rather than risk missing out
on a good thing, and overconfident investors have irrationally optimistic beliefs about the
value of their contribution to the investment (Grinblatt & Keloharju, 2009).
In addition, those who have a more favorable perception of the top management
team’s experience invested a greater percentage of their wealth. The percentage of
wealth invested is a proxy for risk tolerance and perceptions of the top management team.
The current work thus suggests that rational motivations, like return on investment,
cannot fully explain the number of risky investments as a percentage of wealth because
some of the investments appear to be driven by behavioral factors.
Limitations
The study had certain limitations that merit attention. First, the data set is crosssectional, with a single set of respondents participating at one specific time point.
Although cross-sectional data allow for examination of associations between measures,
they do not allow determination of causality. Therefore, though the study offers an
indication of the extent to which the measures are related, it does not establish cause-andeffect relations.
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The R-squared values are low indicating that there is much variation that is not
explained. Although the R-squared values in some of the regressions are low, the
significant coefficients on some independent variables indicate their meaningful
influence on the key decisions of angel investors.
Future Research
Experienced investors devote more time on due diligence, invest a greater
percentage of wealth in a deal, and provide more post-investment interaction. Future
studies should attempt to determine if expertise enables angels to identify deals that
perform well.
Interaction is not an option in the majority of financial investments. This may
explain why angel investors are willing to risk a greater proportion of their wealth in
riskier investments, even in cases where they do not spend a large amount of time on due
diligence. Future research could explore whether the ability to interact with these
companies provides individuals with a sense of security, leading them to invest more and
to risk a greater proportion of their wealth. Additionally, investing in groups may also
provide individuals with a sense of adequate interaction to drive them to invest a greater
proportion of their wealth in these riskier investments, again by providing a sense of
security through their own and co-investor interaction and due diligence.
Conclusion
This final chapter provides enhanced discussion of study results. Several
important theoretical implications are discussed that are derived from the findings. As
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individual investors, angels may be particularly influenced by behavioral factors such
as cognitive biases and social influences. There is strong evidence that experienced
angel investors spend more time on due diligence, older investors spend less time on
due diligence after controlling for investor experience. These results suggest that
experienced angels invest in due diligence because they understand its importance.
Gender, risk perception, stage of the investment, and source of the deal also influence
due diligence. In addition, older angels are found to invest a smaller percentage of
their wealth in a deal, perhaps because they seek to diversify holdings. More
experienced angels, however, are found to invest a larger percentage of their wealth
perhaps because experienced angels are more susceptible to cognitive biases such as
overconfidence, or because they are able to identify ventures that will do well and
choose to invest more in such ventures. Deal syndication influences the percent of
wealth invested in a deal. Other results suggest that after making an investment,
angels continue to interact with the companies they invest in. There is strong evidence
that more experienced angels are associated with greater post-investment interaction.
Gender and risk perception influence the degree of post-investment interaction.
Finally, suggestions for future research are offered that include examining whether
experienced angel investors are better able to identify deals that perform well.
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APPENDIX A - THE ANGEL INVESTOR PERFORMANCE PROJECT SURVEY

The Performance Project: Group Angel Investor
The Kauffman Foundation and the Angel Capital Education Foundation with Willamette
University and the University of Washington (Researchers' Biographies) have initiated a
research initiative to gather historical performance data from group-affiliated angel
investors throughout North America. This effort will help to provide benchmarks, best
practices, and perspective to the continued efforts of angel investors to make savvy
investments in new ventures. The aggregate data will be released on May 24th at the
2007 Angel Capital Association Summit in Chicago, Illinois.
The survey is anticipated to take between 5 and 20 minutes. In appreciation for
completing the survey, you can request notification of aggregated survey statistics, as
well as a free copy of The Entrepreneurial Imperative by Carl Schramm, president and
CEO of the Kauffman Foundation.
The information you report in this survey is held strictly confidential, will be kept
anonymous whether you include your contact information or not, and will be used only
for non-commercial research purposes.

The Performance Project: Group Angel Investor
You are about to begin your survey. Average time to complete the survey is between 5
and 20 minutes. You will answer questions regarding your angel investments,
performance of those investments (including closures), and a range of other questions to
provide context for the investment.
At the top of the page, you will see a series of buttons next to the label "Steps" which will
track your progress through the questionnaire. As you complete a screen click the "Next
Step" button to proceed. To move back and forth, simply click these buttons; your data
will not be lost if you change pages using these buttons.
Please answer all questions to the best of your ability.
Thank you for your participation.
Reminder: The information you report in this survey is held strictly confidential, will be
kept anonymous whether you include your contact information or not, and will be used
only for non-commercial research purposes.
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All questions in this section refer to your actions as an individual angel investor.
1. Years you've been investing your own capital in new
businesses
2. Number of new business investments you've made
3. Number of these new business investments from which Required
you've exited (include closures) Select
4. Your years of experience working in new businesses
5. Number of new businesses for which you've been a
founding member of the leadership team
6. Your years of experience working in large corporations
(500+ people)
7. Please name the angel groups with which you are Required
affiliated.
8. Year of birth
9. Your highest level of education:

Select

In what field?
10. Gender

Select

11. % of your wealth that you have invested directly in
new businesses

The following questions ask about each new business investment from which you've
exited, one company at a time. Please complete the question sets starting with your most
recent exited investment proceeding to your least recent exited investment.
12. Business name
13. Business headquarters location i.e. Portland, OR
14. Business's primary industry of
operation
15. Your prior years of experience in
that industry
16. Stage of firm when you made your
initial investment

Select

Select
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Your most recent exited investment. This set of questions concerns your investment
activity with the business identified on the previous screen. Include only cash investment,
not 'sweat equity'.
17. Year of initial investment
18. Initial $ amount invested
19. % of the business owned as a result of
your initial investment
Details of your first follow-on investment,
if any

Year 20
$$ 21
% of business owned after follow-on
investment 22

Details of your second follow-on
investment, if any

Year 23
$$ 24
% of business owned after follow-on
investment. 25

26. Total of any other follow-on $'s YOU
invested
27. Prior 12 month revenues of this
business when you made your initial
investment
28. Prior 12 month profitability of this
business when you made your initial
investment
29. Number of other members of your group
that invested with you at your initial
investment
30. Number of hours of due diligence you
did before investing

Select f rom these ranges

Select f rom these ranges

Select
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Source of the deal (check all that apply)
31. From your angel group's initial
screening efforts

35. The entrepreneur/s were referred to
you by friends

32. From your angel group's main
investment presentations

36. The entrepreneur/s were referred to
you by business contacts

33. You were personal friends with
the entrepreneur/s

37. Other

34. You had worked with the
entrepreneur/s previously
Select the top 3 risks / challenges facing this business at the time you initially
invested (no more than 3)
38. Technology still developing

43. Competitive threats

39. Operational issues with volume

44. Required a lot of capital

40. High customer concentration

45. Management team issues

41. Fragmented customer base

46. Regulatory issues

42. Challenging marketing channel
Identify your role with the business (check all that apply)
47. Served on board

52. Took a management position

48. Served as board observer

53. Paid consultant

49. Lead investor

54. Informal but active

50. Represented your angel group in the deal

55. Substantially passive

51. A "sounding board" for the entrepreneur
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Management team experience at your initial investment (check all that apply)
56. Founded and led other new
ventures

60. Significant managerial experience
61. Significant sales/marketing
experience

57. Other new ventures had
succeeded

62. I don't know

58. Significant large firm experience
59. Significant technical experience
63. Number of people on the founding team for this business
64. Number of those founding team members still actively involved at the time of
the exit
65. Number of outside board members at exit
(non managers, non friends/family)
66. Total number of board of directors at exit

Would you say the entrepreneurs leading this venture:

Disagree ----Neutral ---Agree

67. Tried to directly influence how important factors in the
market develop
68. Tried to position the venture to benefit from expectations
of a large and growing market
Would you say that the entrepreneurs in this venture
Disagree ----Neutral ---emphasized:
Agree
69. Acquiring the means needed in order to reach their
existing goals
70. Utilizing current means and capabilities to flexibly
pursue new goals
Would you say that the entrepreneurs in this venture
Disagree ----Neutral ---typically prioritized:
Agree
71. Making smaller investments focused on getting quickly
to positive cash flow
72. Making larger investments, staying on plan, even if it
delayed positive cash flow

137

73. Year of exit event
74. Type of exit event

Select

75. Ownership % at exit event
76. Total cash distributions paid to you
during investment period
77. Total cash value paid to you as a result of
the exit
78. Total valuation of the firm at exit i.e. $0, 30M acquisition, 75M IPO valuation, etc.
79. Your remaining ownership % after the i.e. 0% (sold whole stake), or 10% of firm, etc.
exit event, if any
80. Prior 12 month revenues of the business Select f rom these ranges
when the exit event occurred
81. Prior 12 month profitability of the Select f rom these ranges
business when the exit event occurred
82. Total amount of formal venture capital the Select f rom these ranges
business took on prior to your exit
83. Frequency of interaction with the business

Select f rom these options:

Instructions:
You have completed questions concerning your investment in this company. If you need
to edit any information entered for this business, click on the appropriate button in the
"Steps" bar at the top of the page.
To save your responses and advance to the next exit, click on the "Done with this
company" button at the top of the page.
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APPENDIX B – ROBUSTNESS TESTS
Table B1 - Panel A
Percentage of wealth - logistic regressions

Variable

model with
with
with
with
with
with
all
yearsinv yearsentre numfounded totalinv totalexits
experience experience experience experience experience experience
variables
only
only
only
only
only

-4.46***
(-7.11)
-0.23
Gender
(-1.09)
-0.05
Education
(-0.69)
0.07***
Years Investing
(6.50)
0.04***
Years Entrepreneur
(5.30)
0.08***
N Firms Founded
(4.39)
0.04**
Total Investments
(2.27)
0.01
Total Exits
(0.60)
-21.99***
cut1
Constant
(-8.26)
-20.03***
cut2
Constant
(-7.91)
-19.13***
cut3
Constant
(-7.59)
cut4
-18.75***
Constant
(-7.47)
-18.63***
cut5
Constant
(-7.42)
cut6
-17.29***
Constant
(-6.99)
cut7
-17.23***
Constant
(-6.97)
cut8
-17.08***
Constant
(-6.93)
Age (Log)

-2.64*** -2.91***
(-5.58)
(-5.40)
0.05
0.05
(0.24)
(0.20)
-0.11
-0.01
(-0.10)
(-1.29)
0.11***
(9.36)
0.07***
(9.83)

-1.38***
(-2.98)
0.16
(0.74)
-0.14
(-1.56)

-2.19*** -1.84***
(-3.65)
(-4.06)
0.11
0.06
(0.29)
(0.49)
-0.08
-0.06
(-0.71)
(-1.07)

0.17***
(5.70)
0.07***
(5.72)

-14.76***
(-6.93)
-12.85***
(-6.42)
-12.00***
(-6.01)
-11.65***
(-5.86)
-11.55***
(-5.80)
-10.35***
(-5.24)
-10.30***
(-5.22)
-10.17***
(-5.16)

-16.02***
(-7.14)
-14.11***
(-6.68)
-13.27***
(-6.31)
-12.92***
(-6.16)
-12.81***
(-6.09)
-11.59***
(-5.56)
-11.54***
(-5.54)
-11.42***
(-5.49)

-10.15***
(-5.05)
-8.27***
(-4.40)
-7.46***
(-3.99)
-7.12***
(-3.82)
-7.02***
(-3.75)
-5.87***
(-3.16)
-5.82***
(-3.13)
-5.70***
(-3.08)

-13.20***
(-5.73)
-11.30***
(-5.17)
-10.46***
(-4.80)
-10.11***
(-4.66)
-10.01***
(-4.61)
-8.85***
(-4.12)
-8.80***
(-4.09)
-8.68***
(-4.04)

0.11***
(7.11)
-12.07***
(-5.49)
-10.18***
(-4.92)
-9.34***
(-4.54)
-9.01***
(-4.39)
-8.90***
(-4.33)
-7.76***
(-3.79)
-7.70***
(-3.77)
-7.59***
(-3.72)
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-10.11***
(-5.13)
-9.05***
(-4.63)
-8.88***
(-4.54)
-8.48***
(-4.32)
-8.41***
(-4.29)
-7.68***
(-3.93)
-7.24***
(-3.72)
-6.90***
(-3.54)
-6.85***
(-3.51)
-6.58***
(-3.37)
-5.81***
(-2.96)
-5.75***
(-2.93)
-5.62***
(-2.88)
-4.51**
(-2.20)
-4.10**
(-1.98)
-3.40
(-1.60)

Observations

631

637

639

Pseudo R2

0.08

0.05

0.03

cut10
cut11
cut12
cut13
cut14
cut15
cut16
cut17
cut18
cut19
cut20
cut21
cut22
cut23
cut24

Constant
Constant
Constant
Constant
Constant
Constant
Constant
Constant
Constant
Constant
Constant
Constant
Constant
Constant
Constant
Constant

-8.63***
(-4.02)
-7.58***
(-3.57)
-7.42***
(-3.50)
-7.04***
(-3.33)
-6.97***
(-3.30)
-6.26***
(-2.98)
-5.86***
(-2.80)
-5.54***
(-2.64)
-5.49***
(-2.62)
-5.24**
(-2.50)
-4.49**
(-2.15)
-4.43**
(-2.12)
-4.31**
(-2.07)
-3.11
(-1.46)
-2.67
(-1.24)
-1.97
(-0.90)

-7.53***
(-3.69)
-6.54***
(-3.22)
-6.38***
(-3.15)
-6.01***
(-2.96)
-5.95***
(-2.93)
-5.26***
(-2.61)
-4.87**
(-2.42)
-4.56**
(-2.26)
-4.52**
(-2.23)
-4.27**
(-2.11)
-3.57*
(-1.76)
-3.51*
(-1.73)
-3.40*
(-1.68)
-2.34
(-1.10)
-1.93
(-0.90)
-1.23
(-0.56)

639

637

641

0.02

0.04

0.03

-11.36*** -5.65***
(-3.05)
(-5.46)
-10.35*** -4.70**
(-2.54)
(-4.99)
-10.20*** -4.56**
(-2.46)
(-4.92)
-9.86*** -4.21**
(-2.27)
(-4.75)
-9.79*** -4.14**
(-4.72)
(-2.23)
-3.47*
-9.13***
(-1.88)
(-4.41)
-8.72***
-3.08*
(-4.23)
(-1.67)
-2.77
-8.42***
(-4.08)
(-1.50)
-2.73
-8.37***
(-1.47)
(-4.04)
-8.12***
-2.48
(-1.33)
(-3.92)
-1.75
-7.41***
(-3.56)
(-0.94)
-1.69
-7.35***
(-3.54)
(-0.91)
-1.57
-7.24***
(-3.49)
(-0.84)
-6.17***
-0.47
(-2.84)
(-0.24)
-0.05
-5.76***
(-0.03)
(-2.62)
-5.06**
0.65
(0.32)
(-2.26)

-17.01***
(-6.90)
-15.79***
(-6.48)
-15.60***
(-6.41)
-15.16***
(-6.24)
-15.09***
(-6.21)
-14.33***
(-5.93)
-13.89***
(-5.75)
-13.54***
(-5.59)
-13.49***
(-5.56)
-13.22***
(-5.45)
-12.40***
(-5.12)
-12.33***
(-5.09)
-12.19***
(-5.06)
-10.94***
(-4.40)
-10.52***
(-4.20)
-9.82***
(-3.85)

cut9

Note: A single asterisk (*) indicates that the estimate is significant at the 10-percent level, a double
asterisk (**) indicates significance at the 5-percent level, and a triple asterisk (***) indicates
significance at the 1-percent level. Robust z-statistics are in parentheses.
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Table B1 - Panel B
Percentage of Wealth - logistic regressions
Model with
Variable
additional
variables
-5.64***
Age (Log)
(-4.28)
-0.77*
Gender
(-1.88)
-0.10
Education
(-0.72)
0.06***
Years Investing
(2.89)
0.08***
Years Entrepreneur
(4.63)
0.07**
N Firms Founded
(2.01)
0.05***
Total Investments
(2.81)
0.02
Total Exits
(0.52)
0.52*
TMT Experience
(1.67)
Management Risk
Stage: Seed
Stage: Startup
Co-investors
Source: Group Screening

-0.08**
(-2.39)

mgmtrisk

source

-4.65***
(-2.91)
-1.11**
(-2.34)
-0.05
(-0.33)
0.14***
(4.66)
0.07***
(3.35)
0.10***
(3.30)
0.09***
(4.16)
0.01
(0.28)
-0.38
(-0.83)
-0.49
(-1.33)
-0.12
(-0.20)
0.07
(0.14)
-0.11***
(-2.89)

-5.55***
(-3.67)
-0.88**
(-1.98)
-0.18
(-1.27)
0.12***
(4.42)
0.10***
(4.64)
0.07**
(2.14)
0.05**
(2.51)
0.03
(0.78)
0.04
(0.12)

-0.21
(-0.47)
-0.02
(-0.04)
-0.07**
(-2.07)
0.18
(0.49)
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cut1

-25.34***
(-4.72)
-24.68***
(-4.62)
-24.26***
(-4.56)
-24.06***
(-4.52)
-22.41***
(-4.27)
-22.24***
(-4.25)
-22.14***
(-4.24)
-22.08***
(-4.23)
-20.48***
(-3.97)
-20.37***
(-3.94)
-20.06***
(-3.88)
-19.17***
(-3.72)
-18.74***
(-3.64)
-18.24***
(-3.55)
-17.31***
(-3.39)
-17.10***
(-3.34)
-16.84***
(-3.31)
-14.74***
(-2.74)

-21.29***
(-3.26)
-20.69***
(-3.20)
-20.17***
(-3.14)
-19.99***
(-3.11)
-18.50***
(-2.90)
-18.31***
(-2.87)
-18.26***
(-2.87)
-18.21***
(-2.86)
-16.42***
(-2.61)
-16.22**
(-2.57)
-15.87**
(-2.50)
-14.39**
(-2.26)
-14.27**
(-2.24)
-14.00**
(-2.19)
-12.68**
(-1.97)
-12.40*
(-1.92)
-12.02*
(-1.88)
-10.76
(-1.61)

-24.77***
(-4.02)
-24.16***
(-3.96)
-23.69***
(-3.90)
-23.48***
(-3.86)
-21.89***
(-3.65)
-21.73***
(-3.63)
-21.69***
(-3.62)
-21.65***
(-3.62)
-19.81***
(-3.35)
-19.67***
(-3.33)
-19.41***
(-3.27)
-18.15***
(-3.07)
-17.89***
(-3.04)
-17.44***
(-2.95)
-16.34***
(-2.77)
-16.12***
(-2.73)
-15.86***
(-2.70)
-14.37**
(-2.35)

Observations

192

135

163

Pseudo R2

0.13

0.17

0.16

cut2
cut3
cut4
cut5
cut6
cut7
cut8
cut9
cut10
cut11
cut12
cut13
cut14
cut15
cut16
cut17
cut18

Constant
Constant
Constant
Constant
Constant
Constant
Constant
Constant
Constant
Constant
Constant
Constant
Constant
Constant
Constant
Constant
Constant
Constant

Note: A single asterisk (*) indicates that the estimate is significant at the 10-percent level,
a double asterisk (**) indicates significance at the 5-percent level, and a triple asterisk
(***) indicates significance at the 1-percent level. Robust z-statistics are in parentheses.

Table B2 - Panel A
Percentage of wealth - OLS regressions
model with all
with yearsinv
Variable
experience
experience only
variables
-24.48***
-20.51***
Age (Log)
(-6.02)
(-5.20)
0.92
2.07*
Gender
(0.83)
(1.84)
0.05
0.59
Education
(0.09)
(0.88)
0.61***
0.77***
Years Investing
(5.94)
(8.10)
0.10*
Years Entrepreneur
(1.81)
0.75***
N Firms Founded
(2.94)
0.20*
Total Investments
(1.90)
-0.20
Total Exits
(-1.26)
102.69***
87.68***
Constant
(6.21)
(5.45)

with yearsentre with numfounded
with totalinv
experience only experience only experience only
-20.88***
(-5.01)
2.96**
(2.23)
-0.03
(-0.04)

-13.18***
(-3.27)
3.09**
(2.42)
-0.46
(-0.64)

-13.39***
(-2.96)
2.64**
(1.97)
0.17
(0.22)

with totalexits
experience only
-13.34***
(-3.27)
2.95**
(2.27)
0.32
(0.40)

0.43***
(7.88)
1.30***
(4.79)
0.34***
(2.84)

90.88***
(5.33)

62.53***
(3.82)

62.73***
(3.47)

0.59***
(5.23)
63.36***
(3.78)

Observations

631

637

639

639

637

641

R-squared

0.25

0.19

0.09

0.10

0.08

0.06
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Note: A single asterisk (*) indicates that the estimate is significant at the 10-percent level, a double asterisk (**) indicates significance
at the 5-percent level, and a triple asterisk (***) indicates significance at the 1-percent level. Robust z-statistics are in parentheses.
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Table B2 - Panel B
Percentage of Wealth - OLS regressions
Model with
Variable
additional variables
-23.65***
Age (Log)
(-3.34)
-0.81
Gender
(-0.40)
-0.86
Education
(-0.84)
0.63***
Years Investing
(3.16)
0.26***
Years Entrepreneur
(2.62)
0.39
N Firms Founded
(1.12)
0.19
Total Investments
(1.24)
-0.26
Total Exits
(-0.92)
3.99*
TMT Experience
-1.68

mgmtrisk

source
-18.97**
(-2.43)
-1.76
(-0.95)
-1.94*
(-1.82)
1.10***
(4.32)
0.28***
(2.71)
0.36
(0.95)
0.07
(0.40)
-0.19
(-0.65)
1.20
(0.38)

-0.28
(-1.36)

-17.75**
(-2.11)
-1.45
(-0.76)
-1.62
(-1.31)
1.09***
(4.47)
0.18
(1.50)
0.54
(1.47)
0.26
(1.57)
-0.33
(-1.15)
0.11
(0.03)
-0.28
(-0.12)
-1.87
(-0.55)
-1.94
(-0.71)
-0.40**
(-2.52)

100.59***
(3.48)

79.75**
(2.27)

-1.57
(-0.64)
-1.07
(-0.47)
-0.31
(-1.20)
2.36
(0.73)
83.79***
(2.62)

Observations

192

135

163

R-squared

0.33

0.43

0.39

Management Risk
Stage: Seed
Stage: Startup
Co-investors
Source: Group Screening
Constant

Note: A single asterisk (*) indicates that the estimate is significant at the 10-percent level,
a double asterisk (**) indicates significance at the 5-percent level, and a triple asterisk
(***) indicates significance at the 1-percent level. Robust z-statistics in parentheses.

Table B3 - Panel A
Post-investment interaction (times/year) - Tobit regressions
model with all
with yearsinv
with yearsentre
Variable
experience
experience only experience only
variables
-38.18
-5.18
8.94
Age (Log)
(-0.49)
(-0.07)
(0.11)
-9.06
-9.72
3.55
Gender
(-0.28)
(-0.30)
(0.10)
3.59
6.55
6.18
Education
(0.29)
(0.52)
(0.46)
7.23***
6.92***
Years Investing
(3.14)
(3.55)
1.41
3.94***
Years Entrepreneur
(0.93)
(3.05)
5.08
N Firms Founded
(1.04)
-1.85
Total Investments
(-1.23)
-2.73
Total Exits
(-1.07)
140.64
8.38
-53.04
Constant
(0.45)
(0.03)
(-0.17)

with numfounded
experience only

with totalinv
experience only

with totalexits
experience only

75.86
(0.96)
10.62
(0.32)
8.33
(0.61)

99.50
(1.23)
9.21
(0.25)
11.73
(0.84)

95.71
(1.21)
7.97
(0.23)
11.72
(0.85)

9.09*
(1.85)
0.43
(0.44)

-308.21
(-0.98)

-391.66
(-1.21)

1.87
(0.97)
-376.03
(-1.19)

Observations

242

244

245

245

243

245

Pseudo R2

0.01

0.01

0.01

0.00

0.00

0.00
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Note: A single asterisk (*) indicates that the estimate is significant at the 10-percent level, a double asterisk (**) indicates significance at
the 5-percent level, and a triple asterisk (***) indicates significance at the 1-percent level. Robust z-statistics are in parentheses.
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Table B3 - Panel B
Post-investment interaction (times/year) - Tobit regressions
model with
Variable
mgmtrisk
additional
variables
75.69
42.19
Age (Log)
(0.76)
(0.37)
-52.36
-41.66
Gender
(-1.41)
(-1.06)
-4.64
-16.02
Education
(-0.31)
(-0.98)
6.15**
8.74**
Years Investing
(2.44)
(2.33)
1.28
1.70
Years Entrepreneur
(0.69)
(0.77)
3.87
3.90
N Firms Founded
(0.79)
(0.77)
-0.50
-1.05
Total Investments
(-0.26)
(-0.56)
-8.32**
-8.60*
Total Exits
(-2.07)
(-1.96)
30.49
26.80
TMT Expereince
(0.96)
(0.62)
66.95*
Management Risk
(1.84)
-55.35
Stage: Seed
(-1.29)
-17.54
Stage: Startup
(-0.45)
-8.98***
-6.52*
Co-investors
(-2.67)
(-1.68)
Source: Group screening
Constant
Observations

-216.47
(-0.55)
185

-81.10
(-0.18)
134

source
67.91
(0.68)
-48.96
(-1.26)
-6.40
(-0.43)
8.21**
(2.48)
0.31
(0.17)
2.57
(0.54)
0.47
(0.27)
-7.81**
(-2.04)
10.84
(0.30)

-1.21
(-0.03)
28.00
(0.79)
-7.78**
(-2.12)
-40.40
(-1.41)
-189.34
(-0.48)
162
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0.00
0.02
0.03
Pseudo R2
Note: A single asterisk (*) indicates that the estimate is significant at the 10-percent
level, a double asterisk (**) indicates significance at the 5-percent level, and a triple
asterisk (***) indicates significance at the 1-percent level. Robust z-statistics in
parentheses.

Table B4 - Panel A
Post-investment interaction (times/year) - OLS regressions
model with all
with
with yearsinv with yearsentre
with totalinv with totalexits
Variable
numfounded
experience
experience only experience only
experience only experience only
experience only
variables
-25.13
4.09
9.28
57.37
76.37
74.38
Age (Log)
(-0.46)
(0.08)
(0.17)
(1.02)
(1.33)
(1.32)
11.39
-2.58
-1.37
6.96
11.70
11.14
Gender
(-0.11)
(-0.06)
(0.28)
(0.49)
(0.43)
(0.46)
0.17
4.01
7.28
7.12
3.13
2.62
Education
(0.02)
(0.36)
(0.29)
(0.43)
(0.77)
(0.76)
5.00***
4.76***
Years Investing
(3.20)
(3.58)
1.26
2.94***
Years Entrepreneur
(1.28)
(3.48)
4.25
6.89**
N Firms Founded
(1.43)
(2.26)
-1.80
-0.09
Total Investments
(-1.64)
(-0.14)
-1.78
0.82
Total Exits
(-1.02)
(0.64)
-25.36
-207.50
-272.55
-267.64
119.65
0.26
Constant
(-1.18)
(-1.19)
(0.54)
(0.00)
(-0.12)
(-0.92)
Observations

242

244

245

245

243

245

R-squared

0.14

0.10

0.06

0.05

0.01

0.02
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Note: A single asterisk (*) indicates that the estimate is significant at the 10-percent level, a double asterisk (**) indicates
significance at the 5-percent level, and a triple asterisk (***) indicates significance at the 1-percent level. Robust zstatistics are in parentheses.
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Table B4 - Panel B
Post-investment interaction (times/year) - OLS regressions
Model with
Management and
Variable
additional variables
stage risk
-23.65***
-17.75**
Age (Log)
(-3.34)
(-2.11)
-0.81
-1.45
Gender
(-0.40)
(-0.76)
-0.86
-1.62
Education
(-0.84)
(-1.31)
0.63***
1.09***
Years Investing
(3.16)
(4.47)
0.26***
0.18
Years Entrepreneur
(2.62)
(1.50)
0.39
0.54
N Firms Founded
(1.12)
(1.47)
0.19
0.26
Total Investments
(1.24)
(1.57)
-0.26
-0.33
Total Exits
(-0.92)
(-1.15)
3.99*
0.11
TMT Experience
(1.68)
(0.03)
-0.28
Management Risk
(-0.12)
-1.87
Stage: Seed
(-0.55)
-1.94
Stage: Startup
(-0.71)
-0.28
-0.40**
Co-investors
(-1.36)
(-2.52)

Source
-18.97**
(-2.43)
-1.76
(-0.95)
-1.94*
(-1.82)
1.10***
(4.32)
0.28***
(2.71)
0.36
(0.95)
0.07
(0.40)
-0.19
(-0.65)
1.20
(0.38)

100.59***
(3.48)

79.75**
(2.27)

-1.57
(-0.64)
-1.07
(-0.47)
-0.31
(-1.20)
2.36
(0.73)
83.79***
(2.62)

Observations

192

135

163

R-squared

0.30

0.37

0.39

Source: Group Screening
Constant

Note: A single asterisk (*) indicates that the estimate is significant at the 10-percent
level, a double asterisk (**) indicates significance at the 5-percent level, and a triple
asterisk (***) indicates significance at the 1-percent level. Robust z-statistics are in
parentheses.

